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vABSTRACT 
 
Over the last fifteen years, beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act 
of 1990, the Federal government and specifically, the Department of Defense 
have been in an ambitious financial reform effort.  However, the Government 
Accountability Office, the efficiency, economy and effectiveness experts who 
report to the U.S. Congress continue to criticize the DoD’s efforts at reform. This 
paper applies a specific methodology to determine if success factors, i.e. factors 
that substantially contribute to achieving a “clean” audit opinion within 
governmental organizations, exist within DoD components.  This thesis seeks to 
answer two questions: whether DoD agencies with clean, disclaimed, or qualified 
audit opinions display common success factors, found in prior research, that 
contribute to clean audit opinions and whether the DoD, as a whole, exhibits 
those success factors as well.  The benefits of this study include contributing to 
DoD’s efforts to achieve clean audit opinions and the benefits contained therein.  
Moreover, this paper seeks to extend the examination of DoD components that 
are required to submit independent, audited financial statements.    Finally, this 
paper provides specific recommendations based upon common strategies of 
unqualified-audit DoD agencies to those DoD components that have yet to obtain 
























Over the last fifteen years, beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act 
of 1990 (CFO Act), the Federal government and specifically, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) have been engaged in an ambitious financial reform effort.  
However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) continues to criticize 
DoD’s efforts at reform. To answer the question of whether the DoD is making 
positive strides in complying with the CFO Act, this study investigated selected 
reporting entities that comprise the Department of Defense to determine if those 
components are making progress in gaining or sustaining clean audit opinions. If 
a critical mass of Defense components achieves auditable financial statements, 
then the DoD should logically follow. 
This research uses Douglas A. Brook’s study Audited Financial 
Statements: Getting and Sustaining “Clean” Opinions, as its methodology. 
Financial management policy documents were reviewed and financial 
management officials were interviewed either by telephone or via e-mail.  The 
DoD components who responded to this study were: the U.S. Army, U.S. Air 
Force, U.S. Navy, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Military 
Retirement Fund, the Defense Commissary Agency, the Defense Information 
Systems Agency and the Defense Logistics Agency.  
This thesis addresses two questions: whether DoD components with 
clean, qualified or disclaimed audit opinions display the success factors that 
contribute to clean audits found by Brook and secondly, whether those common 
traits may be prescriptive for the DoD as a whole. Specifically, six success 
factors found in organizations with successful audit outcomes were examined: 
leadership commitment, positive resourcing, partnering with auditors (the 
Department of Defense Inspector General or DoD IG), cooperation with non-
financial managers, short-term systems and extraordinary effort.   
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Findings    
All three services (the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy) were all graded 
positively on leadership commitment.  However, expanded leadership 
commitment is essential to: focus the audit readiness effort, assign resources, 
and approve the auditability plan.   
   The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force respondents expressed mild 
dissatisfaction with the funding effort for financial management reform.  If 
leadership commits to a goal of financial management improvement and audit 
readiness but under-resources the effort, delay and loss of impetus is risked.   
  All three uniformed services were graded negatively for success factor 
partnering with Inspector General.  It is not because the services have been 
neglecting this relationship; it is that the relationship is still in its infancy.  Culture 
change, a shifting of the mission, and a learning curve of new skill sets are all 
causes of the tentative relationship between accounting staffs and the DoD IG. 
The lack of partnering with the DoD IG is a contentious issue.  Supporters 
of the status quo say partnering with the DoD IG would undermine the 
independence of the IG and make their assertions suspect.   
All three services were graded as absent for the success factor: 
cooperation of non-financial managers.  The reasons for this uncooperativeness 
were given as follows: lack of education, prioritization, and organizational biases. 
All respondents, whether successful or not in auditability, reported that educating 
non-financial managers and the non-financial workforce was their number-one 
obstacle in success factor cooperation of non-financial managers. 
 The Army and the Navy were graded negatively for the presence of 
success factor short-term systems.  Each service opposed short-term systems 
on philosophical grounds.  The Army and Navy reported that short-term systems 
would detract from the effort to develop a core financial management system.  
While both services have directed their financial modernization effort into 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, the successfully audited 
components have some counterpoints worth considering. 
ix
Both the Army and the Air Force were graded negatively for success 
factor: extraordinary effort.  The Navy was graded positively but the respondent 
for the Navy said that extraordinary effort was not the Navy’s goal; a deliberate, 
incremental approach was the goal. 
 
Recommendations 
  Congress should fence-off funding for business transformation.  
Appropriating money for financial management transformation will send a 
message that the goals of auditability--transparency, reliability and timeliness--
are not simply unfunded mandates levied on a financially-constrained DoD. With 
Congressional funding, the services would have resources legally set aside for 
business modernization not under the control of DoD.  The services could 
continue to pursue independent paths to auditability but a lack of resources 
would cease to be an obstacle.   
      The DoD must ensure that resources are applied not only to the shorter-
term auditability effort but also the longer-term audit-readiness sustainability 
effort.  Recognition that these are two separate but complementary efforts is an 
important factor as well. 
This research concludes that utilizing the DoD IG as advisors will 
strengthen the audit readiness efforts of the components.  The DoD IG’s 
expertise is only partially exploited when utilized only after the financial 
statements are completed.  Mini-audits throughout the year and an expanded, 
continuous DoD IG-led education effort would help components immeasurably. 
 Accountants and comptrollers should take the lead in educating non-
financial managers.  However, both the MRF and the DeCA respondents went a 
step further: if cooperation could not be gained voluntarily, organizational leaders 
should compel cooperation. 
The lack of non-financial manager cooperation reported across the three 
uniformed service components is troubling.  This is especially true when the fact 
that Brook found that organizations with cooperation of non-financial managers 
received 2.63 clean opinions across three years and components without that 
xcooperation received 0 clean opinions across that same time period.  Clearly, this 
cooperation is essential and needs to be cultivated across the DoD. 
The FIAR education plan must also receive greater emphasis.  The 
current educational component of the FIAR Plan is clearly inadequate given the 
lack of awareness of its existence across the DoD. The lack of education 
reported by all respondents for the DoD IG and non-financial management 
remains an ongoing concern.  This lack of education applies to financial 
managers as well.  Proprietary or financial accounting skill sets must be stressed; 
not simply budgetary skill sets. 
         All three successful components point out that short-term systems or 
workarounds are inevitable and useful. The DoD must highlight to its components 
that short-term systems or workarounds are essential and inevitable in the quest 
for audit readiness.  The continued operation of legacy financial systems requires 
that workarounds be utilized not shunned.   
      The fact that the uniformed service components of the DoD reported that 
extraordinary effort was not their strategy is disappointing.  This fact is troubling 
because successful DoD components report there is no way to achieve 
auditability without extraordinary/Herculean efforts.  The DoD must emphasize to 
its components that extraordinary effort is the norm. 
 
Conclusion 
As illustrated in its components above, the DoD still has leadership and 
management challenges in its quest for financial improvement and auditability.  
In its results-driven approach to financial management reform vis-à-vis the F 
Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan, the DoD incurs the risk of 
presiding over a stove-piped approach. The DoD needs to strengthen its 
leadership role in light of the six success factors listed above to ensure 
auditability across its twenty-four components. 
xi
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. BACKROUND 
  Over the last fifteen years, beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act 
of 1990 (CFO Act), the Federal government and specifically, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) have been engaged in an ambitious financial reform effort.  
However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the efficiency, economy, 
and effectiveness experts who report to the U.S. Congress, continue to criticize 
DoD’s efforts at reform.  In fact, Comptroller General David M. Walker states that 
the DoD’s deficiencies represent the largest obstacle to producing reliable 
government-wide financial statements.1
     This paper applied a specific methodology to determine if success factors, i.e. 
factors that substantially contribute to achieving an unqualified or “clean” audit 
opinion within governmental organizations, exist within DoD components.   
     Several components within DoD have achieved and continue to achieve 
unqualified or “clean” opinions in audits performed either internally or by the DoD 
Inspector General’s office (DODIG) or the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO).  To answer the question of whether the DoD is making positive strides in 
complying with the CFO Act, this study investigated the Defense components 
that comprise the Department of Defense and determined if those components 
are making progress in gaining or sustaining clean audit opinions themselves.  If 
a critical mass of Defense components achieves auditable financial statements, 
then the DoD should logically follow. 
 
1. The Problem 
      DoD still has billions of dollars in disbursements that do not match to 
specific obligations.  There continue to be overpayments to defense contractors 
who may or may not be delivering service for payment.  Anti-deficiency Act 
 
1 Mandel and McIntire Peters, “Fiscal Responsibility”, GOVEXEC, p. 1, October, 2006. 
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violations (either over-obligating funds or obligating funds before spending 
authority is received) still occur.  A 2001 GAO study stated: 
Ineffective asset accountability and the lack of effective internal 
controls continue to adversely affect visibility over its [DoD’s] 
estimated $1 trillion investment in weapon systems and 
inventories…Further, unreliable cost and budget information related 
to nearly a reported $1 trillion of liabilities and about $347 billion of 
net costs negatively affects DoD’s ability to effectively measure 
performance, reduce costs, and maintain adequate funds control.2
 
      A 2004 GAO study phrased it more succinctly: “To date, none of the 
military services has passed the test of an independent financial audit because of 
pervasive weaknesses in internal control and processes and fundamentally 
flawed business systems.”3  Clearly, implementation of business and financial 
reform efforts are viewed as inconsistent and uncoordinated.   
 
2. CFO Act of 1990 
The CFO Act of 1990 was enacted not only to improve financial 
management and internal controls of the Executive branch of the U.S. 
government but also to improve public accountability.  GAO criticism leads to the 
conclusion that timely, reliable, and comprehensive financial information is still 
not available within the DoD.   
      The Act establishes “a leadership structure (Chief Financial Officers at all 
Executive branch components), provides for long-range planning, requires 
audited financial statement, and strengthens accountability reporting.” 4 The Act 
was intended to provide audited financial statements and clearly defined 





2 GAO, “Integrated Approach, Accountability, and Incentives are Keys to Effective Reform”, 
2001. 
3 GAO, “Department of Defense: Financial and Business Management Transformation 
Hindered by Long-Standing Problems”, 4-5, 2004. 
4 GAO/AFMD-12.19.4,6, September, 1991. 
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3. What is a “Clean” Opinion 
          An “unqualified” or “clean” audit opinion is based upon the finding by the 
auditor that the financial statements fairly represent the finances of the 
component according to Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards 
(GAGAS).  GAGAS incorporate the standards and reporting requirements of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  The goal of GAGAS 
is to mirror the standards of auditing for public companies except for deviations 
approved by the Comptroller General.5  This is one of the primary goals of the 
CFO Act of 1990. 
A typical “unqualified” audit opinion contains three paragraphs.  The first 
paragraph is a statement that the financial statements of the entity have been 
audited and are the responsibilities not of the auditing firm but rather of the 
organization being audited.   
      The second paragraph states that the audit has been conducted according 
to Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards.   GAGAS refer to: 
  a. Auditors’ professional qualifications and the quality of their work 
  b. performance of field work and the characteristics of meaningful 
reporting6
      The third paragraph gives the auditor’s opinion with regard to the financial 
statements.  Sometimes the auditor may include explanatory paragraphs 
describing how the audit opinion was reached.7
      In addition to an unqualified or clean opinion, there are three other opinion 
categories.  The four opinion categories are listed as follows: 
a. Unqualified Opinion- that the financial statements present fairly, 
in all material respects, the financial position and prospects of the 
entity, in conformance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) [and GAGAS]. 
b. Qualified Opinion- that, except for the matters given “qualified” 
opinions, the financial statements present fairly, in all material 
 
5 GAO-03-673G, 77, 2003. 
6 Ibid. 3, 2003.  
7 Gibson, 2007, p. 50. 
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respects, the financial position and prospects of the entity in 
conformance with GAAP [and GAGAS]. 
c. Adverse Opinion- that the financial statements do not present 
fairly the financial position and future prospects of the entity in 
conformance with GAAP [and GAGAS]. 
d. Disclaimer of Opinion- that the auditor cannot express an opinion 
of the financial statements due to lack of information or the scope of 
the audit is insufficient.8
 
4. Laws Requiring DoD Financial Management Reform 
   The current reform effort within the DoD is in response to several acts 
passed by Congress mandating financial management reform.  A brief overview 
of these laws is provided below: 
      The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was 
enacted because Congress determined two things: 
 a. Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in their efforts to 
improve program efficiency and effectiveness because of 
insufficient articulation of program goals and inadequate 
information on program performance. 
b. Congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program 
oversight are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to 
program performance and results.9
      The aims of the Act were to: systematically hold Federal components 
accountable for achieving program results; initiate program performance reform 
by setting program goals, measuring program performance against those goals, 
and reporting publicly on their progress; improve Federal program effectiveness 
and public accountability by focusing on results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction; help Federal managers improve service delivery by requiring that 
they plan and by providing them with feedback, improve congressional decision-
making by providing more objective information on the relative effectiveness and 
 
8 Gibson, 2007, p. 50. 
9 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html, 1, April, 2006. 
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efficiency of Federal programs and spending; and improve internal management 
of the Federal Government.10  
      The Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) 
was enacted by Congress because it was found that most Federal components 
still weren’t following Federal accounting standards.  Also, Congress found that 
financial management information was still insufficient for Federal agency 
executives to make timely, fact-based financial decisions.  Specifically, the Act: 
a. Provides for consistency of accounting by an agency from one 
fiscal year to the next and uniform accounting standards throughout 
the Federal Government;
b.  Requires Federal financial management systems to support full 
disclosure of Federal financial data, including the full costs of 
Federal programs and activities, to the citizens, the Congress, the 
President, and agency management, so that programs and 
activities can be considered based on their full costs and merits;
c. Increases the accountability and credibility of federal financial 
management;
d. Improves performance, productivity and efficiency of Federal 
Government financial management;
e. Establishes financial management systems to support controlling 
the cost of Federal Government;
f. Builds upon and complements the Chief Financial Officers Act of 
1990 (Public Law 101-576; 104 Stat. 2838), the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Public Law 103-62; 107 
Stat. 285) and the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 
(Public Law 103-356; 108 Stat. 3410); and
g. Increases the capability of components to monitor execution of 
the budget by more readily permitting reports that compare 
spending of resources to results of activities.11
The Government Management Reform Act of 1996 (GMRA) expanded the 
Chief Financial Officers Act.  GMRA requires the twenty-four agencies 
    
10 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra/gplaw2m.html, 2, April, 2006 
11 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financial/ffs_ffmia.html, 2, April, 2006. 
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responsible for ninety-nine percent of federal spending to prepare annual audited 
financial statements.12
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), the 
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) and the 
Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (GMRA) were all efforts to raise 
efficiency and effectiveness within the Federal Government.  FFMIA required all 
Federal agency managers to evaluate the effectiveness of their management 
controls.  The GMRA required all government components to produce annual 
agency-wide financial statements beginning in 1996.  The passage of the GPRA 
necessitates that Federal components effectively plan, budget, execute, 
evaluate, and account for resources appropriated to Federal programs.  Reform 
continued apace.   
      
5. Why Must the DoD Achieve A “Clean” Audit Opinion? 
      The immediate answer is because the CFO Act of 1990 and the 
Government Management Reform Act of 1994 demand it.  However, the DoD 
recognizes the benefits of the legislation.  In the Financial Improvement and 
Audit Readiness Plan (FIAR Plan), the DoD delineates the benefits expected by 
obtaining a clean audit opinion.  The DoD states, “Good financial management 
relies on decisions that make the best use of every dollar spent.  Good financial 
decisions depend on timely, reliable, and accurate financial information.”13  
These words could be taken out of any accounting text.  Clearly, the DoD is 
cognizant of the positive aspects of this daunting effort.   
      Douglas Brook, in his study, Audited Financial Statements: Getting and 
Sustaining “Clean” Opinions provided the foundational methodology for this 
study.   He examined twenty-four Federal agencies and determined six success 
factors common to all who achieved clean audit opinions.    
Brook sees obtaining a clean auditing opinion as a “threshold issue.”  By 
obtaining a clean audit opinion, the DoD will have relevant and reliable financial 
 
12 http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/inforef/legislatemain.htm, November 2006. 
13 Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan, 5, December 2005. 
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information.  Relevant and reliable financial information will lead to better 
management of resources, better management in general, greater oversight of 
decision-making, and better performance.14  Both internal and external 
stakeholders in the DoD will have more confidence that resources given to the 
DoD are effectively and efficiently managed if the DoD consistently achieves a 
clean audit opinion.     
A clean opinion will inspire confidence among the various stakeholders in 
DoD.  Congress will have confidence that money is being spent appropriately.  
The general public will be comfortable that the DoD conforms to the same 
standards as American businesses do.  Secondly, a clean opinion will allow the 
DoD to objectively monitor its own financial performance and make decisions 
knowing that its financial information is reliable and relevant.  For instance, the 
General Accounting Office, in 2001, estimated that DoD was unable to reconcile 
an estimated $3.5 billion difference between its available fund balances 
according to its records and the U.S. Treasury’s at the end of fiscal year 2000.15  
Therefore, the attempt to get clean audit opinions on its finances will also allow 
the DoD to effectively monitor its own agents in support of organizational goals. 
      The Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan of 2006 intends to 
improve financial management within the DoD by improving internal controls, 
resolving material weaknesses in auditing reports, and advancing the 
Department’s fiscal stewardship.  The FIAR relies on the DoD Enterprise 
Transition Plan and Component Transition Plans which were developed to 
modernize existing accounting systems and develop new systems.   
      The FIAR identifies progress to date, lays out quarterly milestones and 
tasks for achieving improved financial information on 71% of the DoD’s assets 
and 80% of the DoD’s liabilities.16
 
14 Brook, 11, 2001. 
15 GAO-01-681T, 3, May 8, 2001. 
16 Defense Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan, p. 7, December 2005. 
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6. Defense Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan 
In December of 2005, DoD published the Defense Financial Improvement 
and Audit Readiness Plan.  The FIAR is a comprehensive and evolving plan to 
systematically improve the financial statements of the Department of Defense.  
Implicit in the language of the FIAR Updates is that DoD is anxious to comply 
with the CFO Act of 1990, namely, to achieve a clean audit opinion to satisfy 
internal and external stakeholders. 
      The June 2006 Update to the FIAR notes that there are 954 key 
milestones to be achieved.  However, the FIAR Update also observes that these 
key milestones are evolving and their total number will change. 
      The FIAR targets four key balance sheet entries for immediate attention: 
Military Equipment, Real Property, Medicare-eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, 
and Environmental Liabilities.  The FIAR is an incremental approach which is 
attempting to address material weakness in financial reporting: a key component 
of audit readiness. 
      The DoD is seeking to make short-term gains in critical areas while 
eschewing the “quick fix” that will appease critics in the short-term but may not 
contribute to sound decision-making in the long run.  The words “incremental 
approach” are repeated throughout.  Ostensibly, this is to emphasize the long-
term nature of this effort and to assuage critics that this effort must be allowed a 
flexible timeline. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS       
This thesis intends to address two questions: whether DoD components 
with clean, qualified or disclaimed audit opinions display the success factors that 
contribute to clean audits found by Brook and whether DoD exhibits those 
success factors as well.  Finally, this thesis will explore whether there are other 
common threads that bind the successful the DoD components that may be 
prescriptive for the DoD as an enterprise organization. 
 
9Primary Question 
Can the success factors identified by Brook be found in the DoD 
components attaining unqualified audit opinions? 
 
Secondary Questions 
a. If the success factors are absent, what are the likely 
consequences for the FIAR and the DoD’s quest for a clean 
audit opinion? 
b.   Do the organizational factors identified by Brook as affecting the  
      likelihood of gaining an unqualified opinion apply to DoD? 
 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY       
This thesis contributes to the examination of the DoD’s efforts to achieve 
clean audit opinions and the benefits contained therein.  Brook, in his study of 
other Federal government components, identified several success factors that 
materially contribute to achieving unqualified audit opinions.  However, Brook did 
not apply this methodology only to DoD components.  This study intends to 
examine only DoD components in order to look beyond the organizational 
constraints that hinder other studies.  By examining exclusively DoD 
components, this study blunts the justification that DoD and its components are 
too distinct and complex to move quickly to achieve audit readiness and financial 
management reform.  Brook’s methodology also needs a fresher look in the light 
of several DoD components having successfully achieved and maintained 
successful audit opinions.  According to the respondents, maintaining a clean 
audit is a much different challenge than obtaining a clean audit.  Components 
with clean audits had definite ideas regarding the actions and managerial 
decisions that contributed to their success.  
       
D. THESIS SCOPE 
      It is impractical to undertake a study of the entire Department of Defense 
due to the sheer size and complexity of that organization.  In order to reduce the 
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scope of the paper, this study sought to examine the twenty-four DoD 
components required to submit independent audited financial statements.  Of 
these twenty-four components, nine respondents agreed to participate in the 
study.  From these nine respondents, this paper gained a cross-section of the 
twenty-four components.  Three of the respondents were the uniformed military 
components: the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Navy.  Three of the 
respondents have successfully achieved and sustained clean audits: the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, the Military Retirement Fund and the Defense 
Commissary Agency.  The three other respondents were: the Defense 
Information Service, the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Special Operations 
Command. 
In this way, this paper gained a microcosm of the Department of Defense.  
Responses from business-like components (DLA, DeCA, DFAS and MRF), large 
components with business-like entities within them (USA, USAF, USN and 
USSOCOM), and largely non-business components like DISA were examined. 
The period of relevance for this study covers the financial reform efforts of 
the DoD components achieving “unqualified” opinions and mentioned specifically 
in the December 2005 FIAR Plan.  This paper will report on the steps taken by 
these successfully audited components to achieve the clean audit opinions and 
will also examine the other DoD component efforts at effecting financial 
reform/auditability. 
This thesis is not a case study of the DoD components identified nor is it a 
case study of DoD’s financial reform efforts as a whole.  Rather, it seeks to 
further substantiate Brook’s hypothesis in light of more data and seeks to apply 
that hypothesis to DoD’s efforts at financial reform.  If the research indicates that 
DoD lacks some of the success factors detailed therein, this thesis seeks to offer 
prescriptive proposals to enhance the probability of success in the DoD’s efforts. 
      Data for this study was derived from DoD guidance, testimonies, briefings, 
and a business literature review.  The analysis was also based on several 
interviews with subject-matter expert personnel in the components described 
below.   
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The results of this research are to assist the DoD in increasing the 
probability of success in its financial reform efforts.  This research intends to 
provide a “checklist” for DoD managers in leading financial reform efforts in 
execution of the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness plan.   
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
A literature review was conducted of relevant business, governmental, and 
public corporation topics.  Internet sites, journal articles, testimonies, instructions, 
and books were also reviewed. 
This research uses Brook’s study Audited Financial Statements: Getting 
and Sustaining “Clean” Opinions, as its methodology for examining the DoD 
components who responded to this study: the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. 
Navy, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, the Military Retirement 
Fund, the Defense Commissary Agency, the Defense Information Systems 
Agency and the Defense Logistics Agency. 
Brook identified six “Key Management Strategies and Tactics” that 
materially contribute to obtaining and sustaining clean audit opinions.  This 
author extended that research by applying the Brook methodology to the nine 
respondent components then applying the methodology DoD-wide. 
Verifying or disputing the extension of the above thesis to these DoD 
components will validate the course charted by the Business Transformation 
Agency in its efforts to reform DoD finances and reporting. 
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY      
Chapter II details the methodology used in examining the respondent DoD 
components.  It provides a description of the Brook hypothesis and a discussion 
of each success factor contained in the Brook hypothesis. Chapter II then 
describes how this study modified and applied the Brook hypothesis to create a 
questionnaire used to interview the DoD financial executives responding to this 
study. 
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Chapter III presents the data gained by interviewing the DoD financial 
executives responding to the study.  It is organized by component and further 
sub-divided by each success factor. Comparisons are then made between 
component groupings: uniformed services and components achieving clean 
opinions. 
           Chapter IV draws conclusions and presents findings in light of the data 
contained in Chapter III.  The presence or absence of the Key Management 
Strategies and Tactics identified in Chapter II will be assessed and commented 
upon.   
      Chapter IV will present a series of recommendations applicable to DoD 
functional and line managers.  Organizational constraints notwithstanding, this 
study makes a strong case that leadership involvement and managerial decision-
making are critical to success in achieving and sustaining an unqualified audit 
opinion.  It also assists DoD leaders by highlighting a set of key tenets that will 
















II. THESIS METHODOLOGY 
      Chapter II is an overview of the methodology used by this study to collect 
and sort data regarding various DoD components’ audit readiness efforts.  This 
chapter discusses the origin of the research methodology, a discussion of the six 
managerial decision-making areas broken into two parts: Brook’s findings and 
this study’s use of the six success factors, and, lastly, commentary on the scope 
of the data collected is presented. 
      All discussions of the research method and the six success factors are 
taken directly from Dr. Douglas A. Brook’s dissertation, Business-style Financial 
Statements under the CFO Act: An Examination of Audit Opinions (2001).  All 
charts in Chapter II are this author’s presentation of Brook’s statistical findings.   
 
A. BROOK’S FINDINGS AND THIS STUDY 
      Brook examined twenty-four departments and components within the 
Federal government over three years (FY1996 to FY1999) to determine if there 
were common themes or factors in earning and sustaining unqualified or “clean” 
audit opinions. The examination of those organizations revealed both 
organizational constraints and managerial decisions and attitudes that were 
statistically found to have a positive relationship with the outcomes of the audit 
opinion. 
      His research method consisted of interviews with financial managers in 
the organizations studied, statements made by the leaders of those organizations 
in congressional testimony, and conversations with the auditors of the 
organizations studied.  Once the research areas were established, Brook 
undertook three approaches to research the data: extensive study of government 
documents and public records, interviews with key financial managers within the 
organizations targeted by the CFO Act of 1990, and lastly, analytical case studies 
of selected components. 
This study uses the Brook construct of six success factors found in 
organizations with successful audit outcomes.  Those strategies are: leadership 
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commitment, positive resourcing, partnering with auditors (the Inspector 
General), cooperation with non-financial managers, short-term systems and 
extraordinary effort.  Brook’s six success factors are examined below.   
The section below is divided into six topics, each with two sub-headings: 
Brook’s findings on each success factor and the current study’s use of each 
success factor.  Included in Brook’s findings for each success factor is a chart 
representing Brook’s statistical data indicating the likelihood of obtaining an 
unqualified opinion associated with that particular managerial strategy.  Included 
in the current study sub-heading for each success factor is a discussion of the 
subordinate questions asked to verify the presence or absence of each factor. 
 
1. Leadership Commitment      
 
a. Brook’s Findings 
           The first managerial strategy positively contributing to an 
unqualified opinion is leadership commitment.  Leadership commitment is central 
to any enterprise but is especially critical in leading organizational change.  
Measuring the extent of that commitment was problematic.   
                 When leadership commitment was present, positive auditing results 
were also found in the prior research.  The conclusion on leadership commitment 
was that when leadership commitment was verified in concrete and substantial 
ways, unqualified opinions were the most likely of the three possible outcomes: 
unqualified, qualified, and disclaimed opinion.  The chart below shows that, in the 
presence of leadership commitment, the number of clean audits per agency was 
2.86 from FY1996 to FY1999, while the number of clean audits per agency 





















Figure 2-1.  Leadership Commitment Effect on Audit Opinions 
Source: Author’s Representation of Brook Data 
 
b. Current Study 
           This study utilized subordinate questions designed to draw out 
responses that indicated, in concrete terms, whether agency leadership 
commitment could be discerned by the respondents.  
       In determining the agency leader’s commitment, questions posed 
sought verifiable evidence.  Was the leader’s commitment committed to paper?  
Were there public statements or testimony given to reassure external 
stakeholders of the agency head’s commitment?  Was there proof that the 
agency leader demanded the same level of commitment from his managers?  
These questions are scrutinized below. 
       Aware that priorities change and managing a complex organization 
demands shifting and varying levels of effort, subordinate questions sought to 
determine if obtaining a clean audit opinion was ever placed on a list of the 
agency leader’s priorities.  Did internal correspondence ever reflect the leader’s 
commitment to obtaining a successful audit opinion?  Recognizing that rhetoric 
designed to satisfy external critics and internal memoranda to facilitate 
understanding of the agency leader’s objectives often differ, questions requested 
respondents look at internal and external briefings.  Lastly, the questions sought 
to inquire whether the senior executive demanded periodic reports and briefings.   
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       Secondly, in looking at leadership commitment, did the agency’s 
leader follow up with actions designed to communicate his or her commitment to 
achieving an unqualified audit opinion?  Did the agency head demand periodic 
reports, communicating the importance of the task?  Key actions investigated 
included whether the agency head empowered the Chief Financial Officer in the 
agency when internal disputes arose over resource allocations. 
 
2. Positive Resource Allocation 
       
a. Brook’s Findings 
           This inclusive term is meant to describe whether the organization 
being studied diverted resources, i.e., people and money, to the project of 
obtaining and maintaining a clean audit opinion.  The application of resources to 
the goal of a clean audit can be examined in three categories: systems, 
manpower resources, and contract services. 
                 Below is a representation of the statistical information in the Brook 
study regarding positive resource allocation.  Components with the positive 
presence of this factor received 2.09 clean audit opinions per agency (out of 
twenty-four sampled) from FY1996 to FY1999, and components without the 





















Figure 2-2.  Positive Resource Allocation Effect on Audit Opinions 




b. Current Study 
           This study looked at two components when assessing whether the 
positive application of resources was directed at systems.  The first was whether 
the organization chose to upgrade its financial management systems.  The 
second issue was whether audit training was given to the finance department 
within the agency. 
                 In upgrading the financial management software, the organization 
commits to rethinking the uses of financial information.  In purchasing modern 
software, the organization recognizes that financial information, in order to be 
useful, must be all-inclusive and developed for use by all departments.  
Accounting tools conceived and developed in the 1960’s and implemented in the 
1970’s have not and were not intended to support modern managerial data 
requirements and reporting requirements.  Managers from all departments must 
make resource decisions based upon financial information that allows holistic 
decision-making to be accomplished. 
                 Secondly, audit training for the finance department within the 
organization deepens the knowledge base of the employees.  Instead of simply 
managing numbers and reports, the finance department can grasp the end result 
of their products and perhaps forestall difficulties in reporting by recognizing 
weaknesses within their own financial reporting systems. 
                 Manpower resources are the means by which an organization uses 
its people, either permanent employees or temporary employees, to produce the 
financial reports required by the auditing entity.  From counting inventory to 
preparing the financial statements themselves, organizations that apply 
significant manpower resources to achieving clean audits consistently achieved 
those results at a greater rate than those organizations not applying significant 
manpower resources. 
                  Lastly, those organizations purchasing contract services fared 
better than those who neglected this resource.  Contract resources can provide 
the necessary expertise to either train staff members of the organization or 
perform the highly specialized tasks of audit preparation.  Some companies 
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utilize the contractor services as a stop-gap measure until their own staff 
members can perform the work required or as additional manpower to attack 
problem areas discovered by their own internal auditing departments. 
       The argument taken up in this paper is that the decision to apply 
additional manpower, systems, and contractor resources in the current austere 
fiscal environment requires even more commitment from the executive 
leadership of the agency.  This commitment takes two forms:  the positive 
application of resources themselves and insulating financial management from 
the effects of downsizing and resource constraints. 
       As a last test of commitment in this program resources area, this 
study asked whether financial managers had complained about a lack of 
resources.  If so, were the complaints ever addressed? 
 
3. Partnering With Inspector General 
       
a. Brook’s Findings 
           From his research, Brook determined that “Partnering with the 
Inspector General” or partnering with the internal audit team was yet another 
critical factor in obtaining an unqualified audit opinion.  Collaboration between the 
accounting and auditing staffs was critical.   
       Presented below is the statistical information found by Brook.  His 
finding was that components with a history of “partnering” or close cooperation 
between the auditing and accounting staffs had 2.09 “clean” opinions per agency 
from FY1996 to FY1999,  and components without that close cooperation had 




















Figure 2-3.  Partnering with Inspector General Effect on Audit Opinions 
Source: Author’s Representation of Brook Data 
 
b. Current Study 
           This study asked four questions:  Were there any prior relationships 
between the accounting and auditing staffs?  Was there any history of mistrust?  
Can the interviewee point to any Inspector General or audit staff exhibiting a 
“gotcha” mentality?  Is there a history of “partnering” with the auditing staff? 
       In determining whether there were any prior relationships between 
the accounting staff and the auditing staff, this study sought to establish whether 
the working relationships previously established had a positive effect on 
obtaining an unqualified opinion.  In fact, previous working relationships did have 
a positive effect on gaining and/or sustaining an unqualified audit opinion.  The 
corollary is that personal relationships between divisions facilitate problem-
solving and speedy reconciliation of differences. 
       In investigating whether there had been a history of mistrust or a 
“gotcha” mentality among the internal auditing staff, the goal was to discover the 
nature of the working relationships between the accounting and non-financial 
divisions of the entity and the internal auditing staff.  A history of mistrust would 
surely preclude problem-solving in the quest for an unqualified audit opinion. 
                Lastly, a history of “partnering” between the accounting and auditing 
staffs would surely be an indicator of anticipated audit success.  Mini-audits, 
integrated process-action teams, and a history of negotiation were all positive 
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indicators a history of partnership. According to research, this in turn, led to a 
greater likelihood of success in obtaining and sustaining a positive audit opinion. 
 
4. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
       
a. Brook’s Findings 
           Cooperation of non-financial managers was critical in gaining and 
sustaining unqualified audit opinions.  Unless the non-financial agency leadership 
throughout the organization understood the value proposition of a clean audit 
opinion, i.e. understood the intent and importance of auditable financial 
statements, unqualified audit opinions were unlikely. 
                      Brook found that components who secured the cooperation of non-
financial managers received 2.63 clean opinions per agency from FY1996 to 
FY1999, while components who failed to secure that cooperation received 0 
clean opinions per agency.  Clearly, this support is vital in the unqualified audit 






















Figure 2-4.  Cooperation of Non-financial Managers Effect on Audit 
Opinions 




                                           
b. Current Study 
           In determining whether or not cooperation from the non-financial 
managers was present, this study looked at four factors:  the history of 
overcoming agency problems with non-financial managers, whether the 
accounting leadership had actively secured the cooperation of operating and 
program managers in the process of obtaining an unqualified opinion, were 
recognition programs in place for financial and non-financial employees to spur 
success in pursuing auditable financial statements, or lastly, had the accounting 
division overcome the apathy or passive resistance on the part of non-financial 
leaders. 
                This paper investigated whether there was a history of inclusiveness 
in problem-solving at the agency level.  Conversely, did the agency have a 
corporate mentality of: operations staff taking care of operations and 
accounting/auditing staffs taking care of the books?  In the words of the Deputy 
Comptroller at Defense Logistics Agency, “we had to get across that everything 
we did, from ordering new products to equipping the soldier in the field, was, in 
essence, a financial event.”17   
                Overcoming agency problems cannot be achieved unless the whole 
agency is aligned toward that goal.  Not only do the accounting and auditing 
staffs have to cooperate, but the agency leadership must ensure that all divisions 
and departments understand the goals and also agree that the stated goals of 
the organization are important enough to merit their time and energy. 
                Also examined was whether there were recognition programs in 
place for financial and non-financial staff members in the pursuit of auditability.  
People are motivated by intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  Aligning personal goals 
to organizational goals in the Federal Government requires more creativity in 
designing rewards unique to government service:   
This would include investments in such areas as the following:  
career development; work design and enhanced working 
conditions; dissemination of high performance models involving 
enhanced culture and empowerment; and improved systems for 
 
17 DLA interview, October 30, 2006. 
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rewards that satisfy public service motives through such steps as 
increased investments in recognition systems for excellence in 
service delivery and for dissemination of information about service 
accomplishments. (Pfiffner and Brook, 2000) 
 
The question for the agency is whether agency leadership has made efforts to 
motivate employees outside of promotion or punishment. 
       As a last measure of the degree of cooperation from non-financial 
managers, this study examined whether the financial managers themselves 
thought that they had overcome non-financial leadership’s disinterest, resistance, 
or lack of interest.  If the financial leadership feels that they are not being 
supported and the lack of auditable financial statements bears them out, the 
perceived lack of support must have some basis in truth.  
 
5. Short-term Systems 
 
a. Brook’s Findings 
           The success factor labeled “short-term systems” refers to the effort 
to align existing financial accounting systems and procedures to the effort to 
attain financial auditability.  The overall goal is to further overcome the financial 
systems’ deficiencies where those deficiencies contribute to a lack of internal 
controls and reliable financial information.   
                     Components who reported employing “short-term systems” or 
workarounds received 2.75 clean audit opinions per agency from FY1996 to 
FY1999, while those components who reported taking the longer-term, 
























Figure 2-5.  Short-term Systems’ Effect on Audit Opinions 
Source: Author’s Representation of Brook Data 
 
b. Current Study 
         Components examined were found to have taken two approaches 
to aligning financial systems: investment in fixing and integrating their core 
accounting systems or building a separate financial information system(s) that 
serves only the information needs of the financial statements, the so-called 
“workarounds.” 
       Components choosing to invest in overcoming existing financial 
system deficiencies clearly made the decision that “workarounds” may have been 
expedient but did not serve long-term agency goals.  Certainly, investing in the 
long-term is the braver choice. Choosing to upgrade, update and expand current 
systems is more comprehensive in scope. 
       Components reported that the longer-term goals of producing 
reliable financial statements, reducing material weakness in internal control, and 
complying with the Federal Financial Management Integrity Act (FFMIA) were the 
components that chose to take the more comprehensive approach.  Financial 
managers taking this long-term approach also reported that they believe it is 
more difficult to get and, more importantly, to sustain clean audit opinions outside 
of the integrated systems approach.18
                                            
18Brook, 2001, p. 33 
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       Conversely, choosing to create short-term “workarounds” is a more 
limited decision that is narrowly focused on obtaining auditability as quickly as 
possible--making the longer-term goals of system integration with budgeting, 
logistics, and other information management systems a secondary consideration.  
Components examined reported building “huge Excel spreadsheets” as financial 
system workarounds.  The goal in doing so was the immediate focus on 
auditability.  
       
6. Extraordinary Effort 
      
a. Brook’s Findings 
          This success factor looked at the lengths to which the agency went 
to ensure audit success over a short period of time.  Brook found a strong 
correlation between those components exhibiting extraordinary effort and positive 
audit outcomes.   
                    Below is the graphical representation of Brook’s findings when 
examining the success factor “extraordinary effort.”  Components that could 
demonstrate extraordinary effort received 2.04 clean opinions per agency from 
FY1996 to FY1999, while components in which extraordinary effort as absent 





















Figure 2-6.  Extraordinary Effort Effect on Audit Opinions 
Source: Author’s Representation of Brook Data 
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b. Current Study  
           This study asked questions such as:  did senior financial managers 
exert extraordinary effort over a short period of time; did the agency hire a large 
number of people to accomplish tasks that the current systems and procedures 
cannot manage; had the agency hired small private-sector accounting firms in a 
less-than-two-year effort; did task forces of extra people or people pulled from 
non-financial sections within the agency count inventories, research acquisition 
histories or enter data; and did the agency spend money on contractors and 
commercial, off-the-shelf software to achieve auditability.  This study found that 
components who could answer “yes” to those questions were more likely to gain 
and sustain unqualified audit opinions. 
                Senior financial managers who were observed by agency 
employees to have exerted “extraordinary” effort provided both an example and 
an impetus to the effort to achieving auditability.  Employee-evaluated effort of 
senior-level managers could be used as a proxy to gauge the effort of the 
employees themselves. 
                Organizations whose mission is not inherently financial, such as the 
Defense Information Systems Agency as contrasted to an organization such as 
DFAS (which is almost exclusively financial), would logically seek outside 
expertise to help align the financial systems of the agency to achieve auditability.  
Successful components recognized this fact and hired private-sector firms whose 
expertise is in auditing financial statements to align their financial systems. 
                Successful organizations also created groups or “task forces” to 
focus on the work-a-day, but vital, tasks that enable the organization to both 
tighten internal controls and reduce material weakness in financial statements.  
These tasks include, but are not limited to: counting inventories, research 
disparate financial records, or simply entering data into the financial management 
systems. 
                 Lastly, components that hired contractors or purchased 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) financial systems fared much better than 
components that relied on existing systems and internal manpower to achieve 
26
auditability.  This decision speaks to the problem of time versus resources.  
Successful components acknowledge that fact and sacrifice resources to gain 
time. 
       
 
B. APPLICATION OF THE BROOK HYPOTHESIS FOR THIS STUDY 
This study is an attempt to apply Brook’s methodology to the twenty-four 
Defense components required by the Department of Defense to provide stand-
alone financial statements.  This list is drawn from the Department of Defense 
Comptroller website from the list of budgetary materials for 2006.  A list of those 
components is provided in Appendix A.  This is the population from which this 
study drew a sample. 
      Respondents were given either an e-mail questionnaire to fill out or 
engaged in a telephone interview with the researcher.  The questions that 
comprised the questionnaire were open-ended questions designed to solicit 
information regarding the six success factors detailed above as having a positive 
influence on gaining and sustaining a “clean” audit opinion.  Accordingly, for each 
success factor, a topic question was posed of the respondent.  The questions are 
listed below with their corresponding “success factor:” 
• ULeadership Commitment U 
o How would you describe your Agency’s leadership’s commitment to 
obtaining a “clean” audit opinion? 
• UPositive Resource Allocation 
o Were there ever resource allocation shifts made to aid in the effort 
to gain a “clean” audit opinion? 
• UPartnering with Inspector GeneralU 
o Describe the relationship between the accounting staff and the 
Inspector General (internal auditing) staff? 
• UCooperation of Non-financial Managers U 
o Did the effort to achieve a “clean” audit opinion ever resonate 
throughout the non-financial leadership of the Agency? 
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• UShort-term Systems U 
o Were short-term (workaround) systems ever employed to bring 
financial statements up to date and auditable? 
• UExtraordinary Effort U 
o What adjectives would you use to describe the effort to achieve a 
“clean” audit opinion? 
      
      To draw out the respondents on the above questions and to develop a 
type of objective scoring criteria, subordinate questions for each success factor 
were developed. These subordinate questions were created using Brook’s 
supporting criterion when determining the presence or absence of a success 
factor at the respondent’s organization.  A detailed list of the six success factors 
and their subordinate questions drawn from evidence of the presence/absence of 
the success factors is provided in Appendix B. 
      In order to objectively score each respondent in each of the six success 
factors a methodology was developed.  This study sought to assign a “yes” or a 
“no” to whether the success factor was present.  In order to do so, the 
subordinate question responses were tallied. If a simple majority of the 
responses or the data supported answering in the affirmative to the subordinate 
questions, then the agency received a “yes” for that success factor.   
      The six success factors “yes” or “no” scores were then applied to each 
respondent and the results noted on a simple spreadsheet.  The spreadsheet is 
reproduced in Appendix C.  
     The spreadsheet is intended to compare the presence or absence of each 
success factor across the respondent components and the audit opinions of 
those components.  The predictive power of Brook’s research is presented. 
      Nine components are represented in the data in Chapter III.  These nine 
represent a significant cross-section of the population of the 24 reporting 
Defense components.  Most importantly, the three uniformed services 
representing a majority of the financial and physical assets of the Department of 
Defense were included.   
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       Also represented in this study are three components that have gained and 
sustained unqualified opinions for at least the last two fiscal years.  These 
components served both to validate the responses given by all components and 
to confirm the areas of emphasis chosen by this paper.  
      Of the nine respondent components, eight were interviewed by telephone 
and e-mailed questionnaires.  One agency responded via emailed questionnaire 
only.   
      It was not practical in this study to attempt interviews with multiple 
individuals within all components due to time constraints and data sorting.  
Rather, a modified Delphi survey technique was used.  The Delphi technique 
questions informed experts independently regarding a common question and 
then collects the responses for a collective review.  This study utilized the Delphi 
technique by creating a common set of questions used to interview informed 
financial management experts within the twenty-four DoD components required 
to submit independent audited financial statements.  Respondents reviewed a 
standard set of open-ended questions designed to draw out responses under the 
six success factor topics.  The intent was to gain a consensus of both successful 
and unsuccessful audit components regarding the understanding and usefulness 
of those six managerial decisions.   
      Key participants were pre-selected for accounting and comptrollership 
expertise.  Respondents ranged from Accounting Division Chiefs to Service 
Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management and Comptroller.  All have spent 
careers both in government service and in the private sector preparing financial 
statements themselves and managing accounting and internal auditing staffs 






III. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
      Chapter III is a presentation and discussion of the data collected from DoD 
respondents taken from the list of 24 components required to submit independent 
financial statements to the DoD.  The list of components and their 2005 audit 
opinion is presented in Figure 3-1.   
In all, there were nine components that responded to requests for 
information. Therefore, Chapter III is organized to discuss the respondents’ 
decision-making in light of the six success factors.   
The first section is a discussion of the three uniformed components: the 
United States Army, the United States Air Force and the United States Navy.  
The second section is a comparison of the three uniformed services and their 
varying attitudes towards the six success factors.  The third section discusses the 
responses from components receiving disclaimed audits but responding 
positively to the study’s questions.  The fourth section is a discussion of the 
responses from three components receiving unqualified audits: the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, the Military Retirement Fund and the Defense 
Commissary Agency.  The fifth section of Chapter III is a comparison of the 
responses from the successfully audited DoD components.  The last section in 
Chapter III is a summary table of the nine respondents with regard to the six 
success factors and their audit opinion results from 2005.   













AGENCY 2005 AUDIT OPINION 
Army General Fund Disclaimed 
Army Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
Navy General Fund Disclaimed 
Navy Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
Air Force General Fund Disclaimed 
Air Force Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) Disclaimed 
Defense Logistics Agency Disclaimed 
Defense Information Systems Agency Disclaimed 
Defense Security Service Disclaimed 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Disclaimed 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Disclaimed 
Chemical Biological and Defense Program Disclaimed 
Missile Defense Agency Disclaimed 
Services Medical Activity Disclaimed 
Tricare Management Activity Disclaimed 
U.S. Special Operations Command Disclaimed 
Marine Corps Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
Marine Corps General Fund Disclaimed 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service Unqualified 
Defense Contract Audit Agency Unqualified 
Defense Commissary Agency Unqualified 
Military Retirement Fund Unqualified 




Figure 3-1.  Universe of Potential Respondents 
 
 A. “BIG THREE: ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE” 
      The three main financial reporting entities of the DoD are the Department 
of the Army, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force, 
each operating its own Working Capital Fund and General Fund. These three 
reporting entities constitute the vast majority of assets under management for the 
DoD.  The Financial Summary Tables Fiscal Year 2006 for the Department of 
Defense show that the total budget authority of each Department was $99.87 
billion, $125.4 billion, and $127.4 billion respectively.  These three totals account 
for over 77% of the DoD’s budget.  It is instructive to look at these three reporting 
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entities because, without them achieving auditability, there is no likelihood of the 
DoD achieving auditability--let alone a clean opinion as a whole.  Gibson 
describes the materiality concept as “the relative size and importance of an item 
to a firm.”19  Since the majority of the DoD’s assets are controlled and reported 
by the above three entities, it would follow that the DoD is most concerned with 
the financial statements of these three uniformed services when applying 
resources to achieve the aims of the CFO Act of 1990.   
      The results of the research conducted in these three entities are 
summarized below.  Objective score totals were applied to each success factor 
to determine the presence of each success factor for each service component. 
 
1. Department of the Army 
      The Department of the Army’s (DOA) results are shown below in Figure 3-
2.  Of the six success factors used to evaluate managerial decision-making, the 
Department of the Army scored positive on success factor: leadership 






















DOA YES NO NO NO NO NO Disclaimed 
scores 5/8 Positive 1/6 Positive 2/5 Positive 1/7 Positive 1/3 Positive 2/6 Positive  
 
Figure 3-2.  Summary of The Department of the Army’s Respondent 
Results 
 
a. Leadership Commitment      
                 The Department of the Army was graded positively for success 
factor leadership commitment.  This was determined by five of eight positive 
determinations for subordinate questions in this area.   
       The respondent for the DOA described the department’s 
commitment to an unqualified audit opinion as secondary.  “The plan is not 
                                            
19 Gibson,  17, 2007. 
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focused primarily at achieving a clean audit, but is focused on implementing 
compliant systems, sustainable business processes and efficient/effective 
internal controls. Successful completion of those things will culminate in useful 
business information for managers.”20 The DOA’s position is that focusing on an 
unqualified audit opinion will lead to short-term goal-setting at a detriment to the 
proper goal of sustainability. 
       However, in the Army CFO Strategic Plan, 10th Edition, 
auditability is specifically mentioned as a goal.  The opening paragraph on the 
Army CFO website states, “The CFO Strategic Plan also serves as the Army's 
road map to achieving a favorable audit opinion on its annual financial 
statements.”21  
       Also, the Army Audit Committee Executives (ACE) committee was 
formed to discuss progress on actions necessary to achieve sustainable 
processes, develop Enterprise Resources Programs (ERPs), and to address 
corrections for material internal-control weaknesses.  Despite forming a 
committee to study the material weaknesses in the Army’s financial control 
systems, resource estimates are only now being identified to correct deficiencies. 
 
b. Positive Resource Allocation 
                 The DOA received a negative grade for positive resource 
allocation.  This organization received a score of one of six for subordinate 
question positives under positive resource allocation. 
       The DOA reported that a mid-range improvement plan was 
formulated within the past several years to address the effort to gain a clean 
audit opinion.  Nevertheless, there were no actual resources shifted or allocated 
to achieve the opinion.  The effort was, subsequently, abandoned. 
  The lesson of the folly in attempting a heroic effort to achieve an 
unqualified opinion in 2007 is still with ASA (FM&C).  There is anecdotal 
evidence of a study completed in either 2001 or 2002 to determine the effort 
 
20DOA interview, October 31, 2006. 
21 http://www.asafm.army.mil/fo/fod/cfo/cfo.asp, October, 2006. 
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required to achieve a clean audit opinion. Additionally, resources have not been 
available for continuing financial improvement efforts.  However, ASA (FM&C) is 
currently identifying resource estimates to achieve sustainability, systems 
compliance, and internal control. 
       The DOA reports that no resources will be provided specifically to 
achieve an unqualified audit opinion as the audit opinion is not the focus of the 
effort.  In addition, due to the Global War on Terror, resources have not generally 
been available for these financial improvement efforts, but progress still 
continues.22
       The Army has reported that any progress made on its Federal 
Information Processing (FIP) has been paid for strictly out of other funding 
accounts.  The Army has purchased a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system 
called the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) based upon 
civilian software.  This system is and is intended to be all-inclusive financial 
management software under the DoD Enterprise Resource Planning system. 
GFEBS is intended to modernize legacy financial management systems by 
updating general ledger management, payment management, receivable 
management, funds management, cost management, and reporting.23
 
c. Partnering With Inspector General 
                 The Army received a grade of “absent” when reporting on the 
success factor of partnering with the Inspector General.  The respondent 
described a “strained relationship when describing issues having to do with audit 
readiness.24   
       The contention is that the DoD IG has a different idea of what 
constitutes audit readiness and efforts to gain a common understanding have 
been only partially successful.  Specifically, the respondent contends that the 
comptroller division understands functionally what the implications and 
 
22DOA interview, October 31, 2006. 
23 http://www.asafm.army.mil/fo/fod/fincom/brfs/sro/gfebs.ppt#263,1,Current Financial 
Operations Initiatives, October, 2006. 
24DOA interview, October 31, 2006. 
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requirements of the CFO Act are and has complied through the Financial 
Improvement Plan; the audit community has applied a different definition and has 
not confirmed that the Army’s accounts are ready for audit.  
       The Army Audit Agency (AAA) is the internal auditor for the 
Department of the Army.  The AAA has been working to assist the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) to prepare 
financial statements for auditability.  The AAA has conducted pre-audits to 
reconcile accounts.  The AAA and the Internal Review offices are becoming more 
involved in completing compliance and validation reviews. 
       To summarize, the respondent from the ASA (FM&C) office has 
diverging views regarding audit readiness with the audit community collectively: 
the GAO, the DODIG, the Army Audit Agency, and the Internal Review staff.  The 
relationship between the audit community and the comptroller staff is not ideal 
from a collaborative standpoint.   
 
d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
                      The Department of the Army was also graded as absent on the 
success factor of cooperation of non-financial managers.  The contention is not 
that other Army components are actively opposing financial management reform 
but that financial management reform has fallen to near the bottom of the priority 
list.  The respondent mentioned several reasons for this:  the war, constrained 
resources, and ongoing communication efforts. 
       The respondent within the ASA (FM&C) office reports that senior 
leadership outside of the financial community understands the importance of 
financial management reform, but that the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan 
and Iraq takes precedence in effort and resources. 
       The respondent also mentioned that financial reform will continue to 
experience “slow-moving progress as long as funding remains constrained.”25  
No resources will be provided solely for the purpose of obtaining an audit.  
Because the Army is in the midst of the GWOT, resources have not generally 
 
25 DOA interview, October 31, 2006. 
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been available for these financial improvement efforts, but progress still 
continues.  Constrained resources, at least for financial management reform, 
continue to plague the Department of the Army. 
       The last reason given for the absence of the success factor 
cooperation of non-financial managers was the degree of success in educating 
those non-financial managers in the value of auditable financial statements and 
financial management reform. The education effort includes making operational 
leaders aware of their role in financial management and assuring those leaders 
that financial information will be used for future decision-making.  The respondent 
maintains that the effort to educate is present, but it is clear that the effort needs 
to continue.   
 
e. Short-term Systems 
                 DOA also received a grade of absent for the success factor short-
term systems. The reasons for this grade include: the philosophy that short-term 
systems are detrimental to the effort to achieve sustainability for the audited 
statements and the lack of resources dedicated to transforming the financial 
management systems. 
       The Army’s plan is not focused primarily on achieving a clean audit 
but is focused on implementing compliant systems, sustainable business 
processes and efficient/effective internal controls.26  Short-term workarounds are 
an anathema to that thought process.  ASA (FM&C) is busy developing 
Enterprise Resource Planning or ERP systems so none of that directorate’s 
resources (time and people) are being used to develop short-term system 
solutions. 
            The Army has been ensuring its Financial Improvement Plan (FIP) 
is integrated with and conforms to the DoD Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness (FIAR) Plan.  The respondent’s view of the FIAR is that it is “tracking 
tool” for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to check milestone dates.  
Furthermore, the opinion is that the FIAR plan is not mature enough to work as 
 
26DOA interview, October 31, 2006. 
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an integrated plan but has support within the DoD (both service and DoD staff 
components) to develop it more fully as such.27
 
f. Extraordinary Effort 
                 This research grades the Department of the Army as absent when 
the success factor extraordinary effort was considered. This absent evaluation 
was due to the respondent’s judgment that the heroic efforts to achieve an 
unqualified opinion in 2007 were abandoned as “fantasy” Although efforts have 
been made to leverage the DoD’s FIAR Plan and align modernization plans to 
the FIAR Plan, the bulk of the Army’s effort has been focused on studying the 
problem and determining what resources would be required rather than putting 
significant resources into solutions in achieving auditability. 
       It is important to note, the Department of the Army has made 
positive progress in modernizing financial management systems.  In December 
2003, the Army commissioned a study entitled “Enhancing the Army 
Management Control Process” by KPMG, a private accounting firm, to assess 
weaknesses in management controls within the payroll process.  The Army has 
also created task forces to oversee financial-systems modernization efforts such 
as the Army Audit Committee Executives (ACE).  COTS or commercial-off-the-
shelf software has been contracted for use to implement the General Fund 
Enterprise Business System, or GFEBS.   
       However, the effort cannot be characterized as extraordinary.  The 
critical distinction is that the Army has no intention of focusing on the narrow goal 
of audit readiness.  The focus of effort is rather on a multi-year process of 
modernizing financial management systems compliant with DoD Comptroller 
objectives contained within the FIAR Plan.  The timeframe for audit readiness 
quoted by the respondent within the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial 
Management and Comptroller’s office is in the 2011-and-beyond range.28
 
 
27Ibid, October 31 2006. 
28 Email, 12 October 2006. 
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2. Department of the Navy 
      The Department of the Navy (DON) results are shown in Figure 3-3.  Of 
the six success factors used to evaluate the DON effort to achieve an unqualified 
audit opinion, three were graded as positive: Leadership Commitment, Positive 
Resource Allocation, and Cooperation of Non-financial Managers.  Below is a 






















DON YES YES NO NO NO YES Disclaimed 














Figure 3-3.  Summary of The Department of the Navy’s Respondent 
Results 
 
a. Leadership Commitment 
                      The Department of the Navy (DON) received a positive grade for 
leadership commitment.  The reasons supporting this grade are: senior-
executive-level commitment to business transformation, internal and external 
communications supporting an unqualified opinion, and the personnel and 
resource decisions made supporting business transformation. 
       The respondent in office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Financial Management and Comptroller), reported that business transformation 
had the commitment of the highest levels of the secretariat.  As most of the 
senior civilian leadership of the Navy has worked in the private sector, business 
transformation efforts have been warmly received and enthusiastically endorsed. 
       Internal and external communications from the DON suggest that 
Navy leadership is committed to both business transformation and, in turn, 
building audit readiness.  Although the current focus is on transforming business 
and financial management systems, as late as Fall 2005, one of the stated 
purposes of the Navy’s modernization effort was, in fact, audit readiness:   
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The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller) is working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) to support the goal of a clean audit opinion on 
Department of Defense-wide financial statements and recently has 
developed a strategy that emphasizes business process 
transformation as the key to audit readiness.”(Veit, 2005, Fall, p. 
11)   
 
Whatever the reason for the subtle shift in relegating audit readiness to a 
subordinate goal encompassed by the goal of business transformation, clearly 
the Navy recognizes the need to transform its financial management practices to 
ensure they are capable of withstanding external audit. 
 
b. Positive Resource Allocation 
                 The Department of the Navy also received a positive grade for the 
presence of success factor positive resource allocation.  The combination of 
financial management system investments, contractor utilization and application 
of other resources all contributed to this positive grading. 
            Resources have been centrally budgeted to support business 
transformation efforts.  This construct makes the DON unique among the 
uniformed services.  Despite the fact that the funding does not have audit 
preparedness as its object, the method of funding is a strong indicator of DON 
leadership’s commitment to stream-lining and integrating processes and 
systems.    
       The Navy has aligned its own Financial Improvement Plan or FIP 
with the DoD FIAR Plan.  Specifically, the Navy has developed an Enterprise 
Resource Plan or ERP.  Derived from a COTS business solution developed by 
SAP, the Navy’s ERP is intended to replace the disparate business solutions 
recently converged. 
       The Navy’s ERP had been successfully introduced in four system 
commands: the Naval Air Systems Command, the Navy Supply Systems 
Command, the Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command.  These four commands had successfully introduced 
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COTS business solutions and the Navy has now leveraged these successes 
enterprise-wide into a single Converged Enterprise Resource Program or C-ERP.  
The COTS financial systems have also been systematically conformed to the 
DoD Standard Financial Information Structure or SFIS.  This standard is intended 
to ensure that although the DoD components are seeking service-specific 
solutions to business and financial systems modernization, these solutions will be 
comparable and scalable to achieve interoperability and consistent reporting 
across the DoD. 
 
c. Partnering With Inspector General 
                 The Department of the Navy received a negative grade when 
considering the success factor partnering with the Inspector General.  The 
reasons for this determination are as follows: institutional biases, past 
relationships, and no history of collaborative problem-solving. 
       The respondent for the Navy reported a prior adversarial 
relationship with the Inspector General.  The interviewee also mentioned that a 
better path to success for the Navy is for auditors and those being audited to 
partner and become allies.  Auditors would point out non-compliant or inefficient 
conditions non-judgmentally; those audited would not assume a defense posture 
and would “open their books” to the auditors.29
       The respondent regarded the traditional role of the Inspector 
General staff as hindering the relationship between comptrollers and auditors, 
internal or otherwise.  Institutionally, the IG staff is set up and excels at 
conducting program audits.  However, the IG staff, like the rest of the Navy, is not 
educated in and has no experience in financial audits.30  This inexperience 
cannot but hinder collaboration efforts between the auditing and accounting staffs 
at all levels. 
 
 
29 Questionnaire, November 6, 2006. 
30 Interview, October 15, 2006. 
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d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
       The Navy was graded negatively for the success factor cooperation 
of non-financial managers.  While the Navy has been successful with enterprise-
level business modernization efforts such as Naval Aviation Enterprise and Sea 
Enterprise, the progress towards audit readiness has not resonated with the 
operational Navy.   
       A respondent for the Navy mentioned that while the Secretary of 
the Navy understood and supports the progress made in business 
modernization, uniformed Navy personnel are moving more slowly from 
awareness of the need for financial management reform to discovery of the 
relevance for their particular Navy branch. 
       While the non-financial branches in the Navy are slow to 
understand financial management reform relevance, financial middle managers 
have not necessarily been the best ambassadors of reform.  Since financial 
managers have been focused on budgetary accounting, they have neither the 
accounting tools nor the training to exploit the benefits of proprietary accounting.  
Furthermore, since they themselves are ill-equipped to utilize proprietary 
accounting, budgeting personnel cannot reasonably be expected to espouse 
benefits they themselves neither fully understand nor appreciate. 
       Lastly, the Navy respondent contends that since a clean audit 
opinion is not mission-critical to Navy operations, that audit opinion will be 
perceived as less important than immediate operational concerns and the need 
to modernize business processes.  In order to be successful, the Navy must 
make the audit opinion relevant to the mission.  According to the respondent, the 
Navy is moving that way.31
 
e. Short-term Systems 
       The Department of the Navy received a grade of absent for 
success factor short-term systems.  Short-term systems are not the route the 
 
31 DON interview, October 15, 2006. 
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DON wishes to take in order to modernize financial management and business 
systems.   
       The Navy, as well as the other uniformed services, had, previous to 
2005, made statements committing to obtaining an unqualified audit opinion by 
2007.  However, when Navy financial leadership looked at the complexity of the 
financial systems, the cost to attain auditability, and the value proposition of 
attaining auditability versus lasting financial improvement, audit readiness was 
abandoned as the primary goal. 
       Specifically, the Navy believes that following its business 
transformation strategy and improving and integrating business systems is the 
most efficient way to produce auditable financial statements.32  This belief is 
based on the assumption that auditability will follow improved financial reporting 
rather than the other way around. 
 
f. Extraordinary Effort 
       The Department of the Navy received a grade of present when 
considering the success factor extraordinary effort.  The score was divided 
between positive and negative responses to subordinate questions within this 
success factor.  However, the aggregate efforts to date add up to extraordinary 
effort. 
       The Navy respondent characterized the funding effort to improve 
financial management as an incremental investment.  Once the Financial 
Improvement Plan becomes a reality, the dollars invested in improvement will 
become overhead in the cost of doing business. 
       The Navy has applied extraordinary effort in its efforts to modernize 
business practices.  Beyond the FIP is the Enterprise Resource Planning 
described earlier.  The four pilot programs launched by the four Navy systems 
commands have been annexed either partially or wholly into the Navy’s 
Converged ERP thereby demonstrating a significant commitment to modernize.    
 
 
32 DON interview, November 6, 2006. 
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3. Department of the Air Force 
The Department of the Air Force’s (DOAF) results are shown below in 
Figure 3-4.  Of the six success factors used to evaluate managerial decision-
making, the Department of the Air Force scored positive on two success factors: 
leadership commitment and short-term systems.  A brief reporting of each 
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Figure 3-4.  Summary of The Department of the Air Force’s Respondent 
Results 
 
a. Leadership Commitment 
                 The Department of the Air Force was positively graded when 
considering the factor leadership commitment.  The Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Financial Operations reports that the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Wynne, is 
“totally behind the effort” to modernize and improve financial management 
systems.33  The Air Force respondent has also reported that the Air Force 
Secretary has made resource decisions to support the effort to improve financial 
systems.  Numerous public statements and internal decisions have been made 
supporting the effort to improve the Air Force’s financial statements and reporting 
systems.  The respondent also stated that the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force were in the process of releasing the new Air Force Strategic Plan 
incorporating financial management improvement as one of seven strategic 
goals. 
       The Secretary of the Air Force also meets once a month with his 
direct reports regarding the Air Force Information Reliability and Integration 
(AFIR&I) Action Plan.  This is the Air Force’s Financial Improvement Plan (FIP).  
                                            
33DOAF interview, November 1, 2006. 
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The Secretary chairs the meetings, looking for solutions for improving the 
financial reporting and for meeting milestones in the AFIR&I action plan. 
       However, the Air Force also makes the critical declaration that 
auditability is merely a metric.  The true goal, according to the respondent, is 
accurate, timely, and meaningful financial information. 
 
b. Positive Resource Allocation 
                 The Department of the Air Force was negatively graded for the 
success factor positive resource allocation.  The reasons for this grade were the 
constrained resources within the department, working within existing manpower 
levels, and the education effort that must be undertaken to change accounting 
philosophies.  
       The Air Force respondent also reported constrained resources as a 
limiting factor in the movement to improve financial management within the 
Department of the Air Force.  When questioned about complaints regarding a 
lack of resources for this report, the respondent answered, “No, not all the 
resources we want.”  He then modified the response to include: we have all the 
resources we need, not always what I’ve asked for…our fair share.”34  The 
implication is that financial management reform efforts compete for resources 
within the Air Force budget and are not budgeted separately. 
       The respondent answered negatively the question regarding 
temporary labor for producing financial statements and other tasks required for 
achieving a clean audit opinion.  The Air Force is working primarily through its 
existing workforce to attain financial management reform.  The response 
reflected the belief that the Air Force had the internal expertise necessary to 
change the “way we’re doing business.”35  The Air Force has made personnel 
changes within the financial directorate, not in hiring extra people but in 
redirecting people within the directorate.  
 
34DOAF Interview, November 1, 2006. 
35 Ibid, November 1, 2006. 
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       Lastly, while the Air Force has not been conducting audit training 
for its financial directorate people, it has been contemplating the change in 
thinking required by the financial improvement plan.  The change must occur 
between thinking like budgetary accountants to thinking like proprietary 
accountants--a significant shift.  Budgetary accountants are only concerned that 
account totals match and that resources are properly accounted for.  Proprietary 
accountants go beyond budgetary accounting and are concerned with 
demonstrating value for resources expended and properly accounting for 
liabilities. 
 
c. Partnering With Inspector General 
                 The Department of the Air Force received a negative grade when 
considering the success factor partnering with the Inspector General.  The 
reasons for assigning this grade are: independence of the Inspector General, 
disagreement on strategy, and the rigid standards imposed upon the Air Force 
Inspector General directorate. 
       The Air Force respondent was insistent that a close collaborative 
relationship with the Inspector General staff was a paradigm shift and that the 
independence of the IG staff was an asset that would necessarily be 
compromised should that staff seek a more collaborative role with the financial 
management directorate. 
       The respondent also reported a difference in strategy between the 
financial management directorate and the Inspector General staff.  The strategy 
discussed was the Financial Improvement Plan or the Air Force Information 
Reliability and Integration (AFIR&I) Action plan. The specific issue being 
discussed is what constitutes audit readiness. The Air Force respondent 
maintains that the relationship between the audit community (including the Air 
Force Inspector General staff) and the financial management directorate is 
evolving and becoming more collaborative, but further negotiation remains. 
       The last reason for the lack of partnering with the Inspector General 
(IG) is that the rigid standards imposed upon the IG render a closer relationship 
45
difficult at best.  Their argument is if the IG staff were complicit in readying the 
financial statements for audit and then confirmed that the assertion packages 
were ready for independent audit, then the Inspector General’s attestation would 
be tainted and suspect. 
 
d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
                 The Department of the Air Force was negatively graded for the 
success factor cooperation of non-financial managers.  The Air Force financial 
community, like the financial communities in the other uniformed services, has 
difficulty in convincing non-financial leadership of the importance of financial 
management reform.  Immediate concerns--such as the war effort and rebuilding 
infrastructure--trump financial management concerns. 
       The respondent notes that financial constraints have actually 
helped build the case for the need to reform.  Ensuring value for dollars spent is 
a theme that has helped build consensus among financial and non-financial 
leaders.  The respondent has been called in to meetings of all kinds: acquisition, 
personnel and logistics.  Cooperation and understanding have been building but 
the burden for building up these relationships falls upon the Financial 
Management and Comptroller directorate. 
       In summary, financial management has not always been 
appreciated and continues to under-appreciated.  A sustained effort is required to 
convince non-financial managers of the importance of financial management and 
financial management reform. 
 
e. Short-term Systems 
                 The Air Force was positively graded for the success factor short-
term systems.  The respondent reported that a combination of short-term and 
core financial system upgrades were in progress.  The ASAF (FM&C) expects 
quick returns from developing short-term workarounds to aging financial systems 
but stresses that the long-term, core financial system is coming.  Also 
contributing to the positive grade were the hiring of a private accounting firm to 
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assist in the effort to modernize and the hiring of contractors to assist in 
preparing financial statements. 
       The Air Force has financial systems that were designed in the 
1960’s and built in the 1970’s.  Modernizing the core financial system is part of 
the long-term effort in financial management reform.   
       The Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (or 
DEAMS) is the integrated system intended to be the core financial system of the 
future.  Jointly developed by the Air Force, the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service, and the U.S. Transportation Command, DEAMS is intended to provide 
increased financial information flow, improve oversight, and provide a platform for 
future expansion. DEAMS is a COTS system developed by Oracle Federal 
Financial. 
       The Air Force has hired the private firm BearingPoint, Inc., to assist 
in the modernization effort.  BearingPoint is an accounting and management 
consulting firm that is helping the Air Force with supply-chain management and 
with purchasing and training Air Force personnel in the management of those 
systems. 
       The respondent also confirmed that the Air Force was investing in 
processes, systems, and people to achieve financial management 
modernization.  Contracted personnel form a part of this effort.   
 
f. Extraordinary Effort 
                 The Air Force’s effort to modernize cannot be considered an 
extraordinary effort.  Although the Air Force hired a consulting firm to assist in the 
effort and purchased a COTS system to replace aging financial systems, the 
strategy of the Air Force to modernize precludes a positive grade in this area. 
       The Air Force has created financial task forces called Integrated 
Process Teams--comprised of financial experts, Information Technology experts 
and functional experts--to examine the financial processes that encompass the 
financial management effort.  These process teams make recommendations for 
improvement to the executive panel that supervises the financial management 
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modernization effort. The teams are chartered to examine processes and 
suggest improvements.  These improvement efforts are contained within the Air 
Force Information Reliability and Integration Action Plan.  Since this AFIR&I 
action plan has been formed and continuously updated for over two years and 
has an implementation and completion timeframe extending to 2017, the effort 
cannot be considered extraordinary. 
       The strategy of the Air Force precludes an extraordinary effort at 
achieving an unqualified audit opinion.  Like the other uniformed services, the Air 
Force has looked past auditability and has adopted financial transparency as the 
goal.  The intended result of this sustained effort is accurate, timely, meaningful 
financial information. 
    
B. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE SERVICES 
      Comparison between services yields significant contrasts and highlights 
the strengths of the different approaches to financial management modernization.  
Below is a discussion of the three services broken up by success factor. 
 
1. Leadership Commitment 
           All three service components reported senior-level leadership 
commitment.  Although senior-level commitment is to business-system and 
financial-management modernization and not audit readiness, commitment at 
this senior level is encouraging.  Support at this senior level is understandable in 
that senior executives are more often than not drawn from the private business 
sector where terms such as unqualified audit opinions, six-sigma, lean, and 
Enterprise Resource Planning or ERP are commonplace.  However, the fact that 
these business professionals come from the private sector as political appointees 
works against them in a system where political appointees depart every two 
years or so. 
      All three services report having formed senior working groups such as the 
Army’s ACE or Audit Committee Executives representing each functional 
organization within the Army.   
48
                                           
      All respondents reported that the service secretaries review the Financial 
Improvement Plans quarterly.  The Air Force had the strongest response in 
reporting that the Secretary of the Air Force meets monthly with his assistant 
secretaries and direct reports.  The key here is that financial improvement 
planning in the form of the Air Force Information Reliability and Integration 
(AFIR&I) Action Plan is briefed monthly at those meetings.   
      
2. Positive Resource Allocation 
      Out of the three services polled, only the Department of the Navy reported 
success in funding the modernization effort.  Both the Army and the Air Force 
reported having to create funding for financial improvement and business 
modernization out of other accounts.  The Navy’s method of centrally funding the 
Financial Improvement Plan has to be considered the model for all the services.  
When facing ever-constrained resources, the obvious temptation is to sacrifice 
possible future gains in applying resources to financial reform at the risk of short-
changing operational concerns in the present. 
      Constrained resources are a reality for the armed services.  However, 
both the Army and the Air Force cited this as a reason for being mildly 
dissatisfied with the level of funding that was provided for business 
transformation. The Army went a step further; the Army respondent stated “in the 
midst of the Global War on Terror, resources have not generally been available 
for these financial improvement efforts.”36  
      Constrained resources must not be considered solely in the light of 
external pressures applied to the armed services.  In fact, the Army’s budget has 
increased substantially over the last seven years.  According to the Army’s 
budget materials, the Army’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2007 is $111.8 
billion, 60% more than the budget request for FY2001 of $70.8 billion. The 
purpose in quoting these figures is not to challenge the Army’s decision-making 
but rather to highlight that internal priorities also dictate the resources applied 
and pace of financial reform efforts. 
 
36 DOA questionnaire, October 31, 2006. 
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      Although the Navy centrally funds the financial improvement effort, further 
investigation reveals that Navy funding levels are not significantly higher than the 
other services when funding for the Navy-Marine Corps Internet (NMCI) is 
discounted.  Specifically, the BTA website lists the Navy funding for business 
modernization at over $2 billion for FY06 and $2.1 billion for FY07.  See Figure 
(3-6)  However, when the Navy’s funding for the Navy-Marine Corps Internet is 
subtracted from that spending, $1.6 billion and $1.7 billion respectively (See 
Figure 3-7), the Navy’s funding for business systems modernization funding 
efforts fall to almost mirror the Air Force’s spending and are less than the Army’s 





FY06 FY07 Total  
Army   2,172.2  520.4  719.5  3,412.1 
Navy  6,410.4  2,032.5 2,142.2  10,585.1 
Air Force   840.3  352.0  457.5  1,649.8 
DLA   1,469.2  303.6 157.5  1,930.3 
DFAS   29.5  7.4 6.7  43.6 
Component Total (millions)   10,936.5 3,247.0 3,512.9 17,696.5
 
Figure 3-5.  Summary by Component of Business Modernization 
Resources 
Source: From U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, November 17 
 
 
Figure 3-6.  Summary of Navy ERP Funds 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, November 17 
 
 
3. Partnering With Inspector General 
      All three services were graded negatively when considering the success 
factor partnering with the Inspector General.  This is not surprising when 
considering the following factors: Inspector General traditional institutional bias, 
the maintained independence of the Inspector General staff, and the lack of 
proprietary accounting familiarity within both the auditing and accounting staffs. 
      The Inspector General staffs’ role within the DoD and the component 
services has been one of auditing contracts and asserting budgetary accounting.  
Breaking that paradigm is particularly difficult considering that, according to the 
respondents, the collaboration efforts between the accounting/comptroller staffs 
and the Inspector General staffs are just gaining ground. New roles being 
assigned to the Inspector General staffs are completing compliance and 
validation reviews of efforts to comply with the CFO Act of 1990.  Time to grow 
into these roles is not unexpected. 
      The Air Force respondent stated that the independence from the Inspector 
General staff was to be respected and not dismissed lightly in pursuit of 
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teamwork and collaboration with the accounting and comptroller staffs.  His point 
was akin to the scandalous conduct of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP 
in asserting the controls for Enron while consulting on and taking part in the 
fraudulent bookkeeping being perpetrated on stockholders. 
      Lastly, the lack of training and tools available for the Inspector General 
staffs in proprietary accounting make collaboration efforts less valuable.  The 
same lack of experience in proprietary accounting hinders the efforts of the 
accounting staffs, as well. The shift in paradigm for both the 
accounting/comptroller staffs and the Inspector General staffs is enormous since 
budgetary accounting rule sets are not being replaced, only augmented by 
proprietary accounting thinking. 
 
4. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
      All three services were negatively graded for the success factor 
cooperation of non-financial managers.  The reasons for this resonated across all 
three respondents: lack of education, prioritization, and organizational biases. 
      Respondents consistently emphasized that a lack of education was a root 
cause for difficulty in implementing financial reform.  Lack of education is 
exhibited by both financial management personnel and others.  Respondents 
mentioned that since they themselves have been nurtured and trained in a 
budgetary accounting world, they sometimes lack the proper skill sets and 
awareness of proprietary accounting benefits.  Since they lack the awareness, it 
is unlikely these budgetary accountants will be able to champion the benefits of 
proprietary accounting and the need for financial reform.        
      Also, respondents stated that operational personnel have trouble seeing 
the long-term benefits of financial management reform when resources are 
strained to the utmost on urgently needed infrastructure recapitalization efforts.  
The Army, in particular, has maintained that, “Any initiative with the word 
‘financial’ in it falls on deaf ears to the non-financial communities.”  This short-
term thinking is understandable while we are in the midst of a Global War on 
Terror and the continued War in Iraq. 
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      Lastly, organizational biases play a role in the lack of cooperation of non-
financial managers.  The Navy has alleviated this problem somewhat by using 
the enterprise pilots in the four systems commands.  The Navy has consolidated 
the four pilots into one ERP system called C-ERP.  C-ERP, or Converged ERP, 
is chartered to support the whole Navy.  As such, the systems commands have 
been heading financial initiatives that resonate throughout the operational Navy. 
      However, the Air Force and Army have a personnel advantage over the 
Navy.  Their professional military accountants and comptrollers are able to 
trumpet the message of financial reform benefits throughout the operational Army 
and Air Force  
      The Navy has no uniformed military accountants and comptrollers.  Naval 
officers filling these billets are often learning while on the job; they cannot be 
good advocates for reform while simply learning the parameters of the system 
they are supposed to execute. 
 
5. Short-term Systems 
      While the Army and Navy were graded absent for the success factor 
short-term systems, the Air Force was graded positively.  The respondents for 
the Army and Navy responded that short-term systems were eschewed for 
philosophical reasons while the Air Force respondent reported it was utilizing a 
combination of short-term solutions and longer-term integrated financial-system 
solutions. 
      The Army and Navy have chosen to focus on Enterprise Resource 
Programming systems for their respective Financial Improvement Programs. The 
Navy had the successful pilot programs initiated by the systems commands that 
have been subsumed by the Navy’s enterprise-wide ERP.  Both the Army and 
Navy believe it would be counter-productive to the more desirable sustainable 
effort to improve financial reporting.   
      The Air Force has reportedly utilized a combination approach in dealing 
with short-term systems.  Along with their ERP financial management system 
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called DEAMS, the Air Force believes in generating quick returns with short-term 
systems while the long-term effort is being developed and implemented. 
      Despite the successes achieved with short-term systems with other DoD 
components, the services’ rationale for choosing the integrated long-term 
solution is difficult to argue with.  It is consistent with their sustainability argument 
that the only way to build strong and enduring financial management processes 
is with integrated systems.  The further argument the Navy has made is that the 
short-term workarounds will achieve only short-term auditability that is unlikely to 
be sustained without heroic efforts year after year. 
 
6. Extraordinary Effort 
      Of the three services, only the Navy was graded positively on the success 
factor extraordinary effort.  While all three services reported using COTS 
software and hiring private-sector consulting firms to assist in their respective 
FIPs, the Navy’s transformation efforts only can be labeled extraordinary effort. 
      Although all three services maintain it is their intention to fund a deliberate, 
incremental funding approach to business systems and financial management 
modernization, the Navy’s pilot project approach to fielding modernized financial 
management software can be labeled as extraordinary effort.  The combination 
of purchasing COTS software, hiring private-sector consulting firms, and creating 
the task forces such as Naval Aviation Enterprise and Sea Enterprise enable the 
Navy to test systems solutions and if successful, apply them Navy-wide.  It is a 
positive action approach that allows testing and fielding in a more rapid manner--
in contrast to the Army’s more deliberate feasibility studies and hesitation in fully 
funding ERP solutions. 
 
C. OTHER RESPONDENTS WITH DISCLAIMED OPINIONS 
 Three respondent components that were graded mostly positive using the 
Brook methodology but earned disclaimed audit opinions were: the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).  These three 
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components reported positively for most of the six success factors but were still 
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Figure 3-7.  Summary of Other Respondent Results for Components 
Earning Disclaimed Opinions 
 
This apparent disparity casts doubt upon the predictive ability of the Brook 
methodology.  Reconciling the fact that these three components scored positively 
in the six success factors but have yet to receive clean audit opinions is 
problematic.  There must be other success factors not considered by this study 
that have affected these components’ ability to gain audit readiness.  Below is a 
discussion of the three components and their responses to the six success 
factors. 
      All three respondents were graded positively for the success factor 
leadership commitment.  The DISA’s respondent stated that the DISA’s CFO, Mr. 
Jimaye Sones, is the component’s driving force to achieve auditability.  
USSOCOM’s respondent reported that the comptroller for USSOCOM is “on a 
mission”37 to achieve auditability and presses forward with remediation efforts 
despite encountering uninformed resistance from other managers within 
USSOCOM. The DLA has reported that uniformed and civilian leadership at the 
DLA has attended every audit readiness meeting and audit readiness is part of 
the strategic plan briefed monthly. 
                                            
37 USSOCOM interview, November 8, 2006. 
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 The DISA, the DLA, and USSOCOM were also graded positively for the 
presence of success factor positive resource allocation.  The respondent for the 
DLA reported that the component asked for and received additional funding in 
order to modernize thirty year-old legacy systems as part of operations and 
management funds.  All three components also reported adding additional 
personnel, both contracted and temporary, to accomplish the tasks necessary to 
improve the reporting systems feeding the financial statements. 
 The three respondent components were also graded positively for success 
factor partnering with the Inspector General.  The DLA reported that the current 
relationship with the DoD IG has improved greatly despite having no history of 
partnering with that organization.  USSOCOM reported success while 
establishing a partnership with the DoD IG and “learning to speak each others’ 
language.”38  Lastly, the DISA reported that the DoD IG had assisted with review 
of the remediation contracts with outside agencies to assist in correcting internal 
controls within the DISA.  The DISA respondent did report that the relationships 
with the DoD IG and regional Inspector General teams were still being formulated 
due to the need for the Inspector General staffs to maintain their independence. 
 Two of three components were rated positively for success factor 
cooperation of non-financial managers.  The DISA was graded negatively for this 
success factor.  The primary reason for this negative grade was that the DISA 
reported that its strategic business units “were still trying to find the balance in 
prioritizing goals and that financial managers and the DISA’s regional 
accountants were still trying to convince non-financial managers of the 
importance of audit readiness.”39
 Two of three respondent components were graded negatively for success 
factor short-term systems.  USSOCOM and the DISA were graded negatively for 
the same reason: reliance on legacy systems.  USSOCOM relies on financial 
management information from the uniformed services because most of 
USSOCOM’s equipment comes from the uniformed services. As such, 
 
38 Ibid, November 8, 2006. 
39 DISA interview, October 23, 2006. 
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USSOCOM cannot begin to modify its financial management systems until the 
uniformed services make significant headway in doing so.  The DISA is also 
relying on legacy systems to accomplish audit readiness.  The DISA respondent 
also indicated that financial management systems improvement would not be 
considered until the DoD implements the Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI).  This 
initiative is designed to be a single financial management systems standard for 
28 DoD components.40  
 Lastly, all three respondent components were graded positively for 
success factor extraordinary effort.  The DISA, the DLA, and USSOCOM all 
reported hiring a private auditing firm to assist in the audit readiness effort.  All 
three also described the formation of audit committees meeting quarterly, 
sometimes monthly, in order to track progress toward a clean audit.  Due to 
financial managers’ influence at all three components, all three respondents 
answered positively when questioned about applying heroic efforts to the audit 
readiness goal.  
 
D. THREE ILLUSTRATIVE RESPONDENT COMPONENTS 
       The next three responding components provide illustrative confirmation of 
this paper’s methodology.  All three responding components reported strong 
support across the six attributes and all three received unqualified audit opinions 
for FY2005 and, recently, for FY2006.  This outcome is expected per Brook’s 
findings. 
      All three components, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
(DFAS), the Military Retirement Fund (MRF), and the Defense Commissary 
Agency (DeCA) for the most part responded enthusiastically to the six success 
factors comprising the methodology for study in this paper.  The success factors 
resonated in the responses given in the interviews and confirmed the relevance 
and predictive ability of the Brook thesis.  Exceptions are noted below. 
 
    
40 http://www.dod.mil/dbt/products/Sept-06-
BEA_ETP/etp/App_E/QuadCharts/DAI_Chart.html, November, 2006. 
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1. DFAS 
      The results for the Defense Finance and Accounting Service or DFAS are 
shown in Figure 3-8. The DFAS was an instructive organization to study because 
it had received unqualified opinions for each of the last six years: FY2001 
through FY2006.  Although the DFAS is the one of the most business-like 
organizations this paper examines, the responses from these successfully 
audited agencies are critical.   
      The DFAS is not only committed to achieving clean audit opinions of its 
own.  The organization is vital in assisting client Defense components in aligning 
their financial processes and statements as well.   
      The DFAS is responsible not only for personnel pay but also conducts 
transactions for client Defense components.  The DFAS maintains accounts for 
Defense appropriations, processes Defense contractor invoices and maintains 
accounting over foreign military sales. 
      The DFAS therefore plays not only an active role but also an advisory role 
to client Defense components in gaining and sustaining clean audit opinions 
themselves.  In fact, the Chief Financial Executive for the Defense Commissary 
Agency or DeCA maintained that the DFAS was a “critical partner” in achieving 
audit success for the DeCA.41
      Below, in Figure 3-8, is the summary of grading for the DFAS. The DFAS 
earned positive scores for all success factors except for short-term systems.  A 
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Figure 3-8.  Summary of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 
Respondent Results 
 
                                            
41DeCA interview, November 13, 2006. 
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a. Leadership Commitment 
                 The DFAS earned a positive grade for leadership commitment.  
The respondent for the DFAS was adamant that leaders within an organization 
were essential to audit readiness for three reasons: ownership of the auditability 
plan, building a cohesive team, and defining the process goal. 
       The interviewee for the DFAS maintained that corporate leadership 
must own the auditability plan.  The key to ownership, in her opinion, was two-
fold: understanding the auditability process and approving the auditability plan.   
       When senior leaders understand the auditability process, they are 
in positive and informed control of the process.  Once leaders are informed, they 
are able to make critical decisions and support key players in the auditability 
process.  Leaders who understand the process and demand updates are in a 
position to sustain corporate focus on the goal. 
       Approving the auditability plan also places senior leaders in an 
ownership role.  In the interviewee’s opinion, owning the auditability process pays 
multiplying dividends.  If the senior leadership is focused on auditability and 
aligns rewards and effort toward that goal, the organization will follow. 
       The respondent for the DFAS gave a second reason why 
leadership commitment was central: when leaders are more involved, 
cohesiveness and shared responsibility result.  With these positive attributes, the 
organization is less likely to waste resources in pursuing the audit readiness 
goal.  The reason for less waste is that the leadership understands, tracks, and 
focuses the organization on the auditability goal. 
       The last reason given for the centrality of leadership commitment is 
that the “definition” stage of the auditability process is most significant.  The 
respondent went so far as to say that leaders must define the resources and 
define the process at the outset, otherwise sustainability of a clean audit opinion 
becomes less likely. 
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b. Positive Resource Allocation 
                 The DFAS also received a positive evaluation for success factor 
positive resource allocation.  The reasons for this positive grade were: 
implementing a new system at the outset of planning for auditability, devoting 
resources at the outset to build a sustainability plan concurrent with the 
auditability plan, and applying resources to education continually. 
       The respondent for the DFAS insisted that planning for and 
applying resources to sustainment efforts while planning for the initial audit is 
critical.  Her question was, “Do you want a whole new audit each time?”42
       The interviewee also made clear there were two different 
challenges presented between gaining an unqualified audit the first time versus 
sustaining the effort.  The DFAS’s challenge in sustainment is that improving on 
a baseline each year is more difficult than establishing a baseline effort of 
auditable financial statements. 
       The reasons sustaining the effort were more difficult included: 
knowledge transfer among arriving and departing employees, process changes, 
financial systems changes, business changes, difficulty of sustaining the required 
energy level, maintenance of focus, the issue of auditors getting savvier, and the 
increasing constraints of regulatory actions.  She calls this the “reality curve.”43  
She describes the ever-changing reality this way to sum up the multitude of 
factors that challenge the way the agency organizes its auditability effort each 
year. 
       Lastly, the interviewee stated her position that resources of people 
and effort must be applied continually to the goal of attainment and the goal of 
sustainment of the positive audit opinion.  Not applying resources continually, in 
her opinion, affects the extraordinary effort success factor. 
 
 
42 DFAS Interview, November 13, 2006. 
43 DFAS Interview, 13 November 2006 
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c. Partnering With Inspector General 
                 The DFAS was graded positively for the success factor partnering 
with the Inspector General.  The interviewee for the DFAS was enthusiastic 
about both the Department of Defense’s Inspector General staff and the internal 
auditing staff within the DFAS.  With regard to the DoD IG, the respondent stated 
that the IG staff was improving at a rapid rate and growing into its new role of 
asserting readiness for independent audits. 
       The DoD IG staff is much improved according to the respondent.  
The DoD IG is exploring and establishing its new role while maintaining its 
independence within the Department of Defense.  The interview subject summed 
up by stating that she felt the DoD IG and internal auditing staff were finally 
realizing that “they were on the same team” and had an equal stake in ensuring 
the DFAS maintained auditability. 
       Lastly, the DFAS respondent said that the auditing staff and the 
DODIG were embarking on a significant learning curve.  Tasks being mastered 
included: understanding what constituted “materiality” establishing new lines of 
dialogue, and validating internal controls to build robustness in the financial 
management systems. 
 
d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
                 The DFAS scored positively for the attribute cooperation of non-
financial managers. The respondent places responsibility for ensuring the 
cooperation of non-financial managers squarely on the accounting staff.   
       The respondent reasoned that, since the accounting staff had the 
subject-matter expertise, it was up to the accounting staff to educate non-
financial divisions within the organization.  Her idea was that “if they [non-
financial managers] do not understand, then you [the organization] won’t get to 
solutions until you get them to see the vision and their part in that solution.”44
       The respondent stated that unless the organization has committed 
non-financial management and divisions, the process will be slowed, if not 
 
44 DFAS Interview, 13 November 2006. 
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abandoned.  As controllers of resources and bases of influence, non-financial 
managers will hinder the effort should they not grasp the immediacy and 
importance of audit readiness. 
 
e. Short-term Systems 
                 The DFAS also graded as absent for the success factor short-term 
systems.  Although the respondent acknowledged the necessity and utility of 
short-term systems, she was cautious about their misuse. 
       The respondent’s experience caused her to state that short-term 
systems or workarounds may not save the organization money in the long-run.  
Workarounds are, by definition, augments to or replacements for the integrated 
legacy system.  As a direct result of this fact, the workarounds cause more labor 
and resources to be expended.  If workarounds are utilized for an extended 
period, the respondent feared they would complicate the goal of audit readiness.  
Further, workarounds could render the process of attaining that auditability goal 
more difficult, if not ultimately impossible. 
       The respondent additionally recognized the necessity of 
workarounds in any organization.  However, her argument was that the goal of 
sustainability in audit opinions should include eliminating the need for 
workarounds. 
       Lastly, the respondent was careful to distinguish between 
workarounds and analysis “tools,” as she called them.  She maintained that 
workarounds were necessary but potentially cumbersome and costly.  However, 
analysis tools are designed for the specific purpose of understanding and 
working specific problem areas in managerial information.  The DFAS, for 
instance, uses an analysis tool called CCAS. It is utilized by DFAS to identify 
variances in fund balances and to assist in explaining those variances. The 
DFAS interviewee maintained that workarounds disguised the shortcomings of 
the legacy financial systems, while the stand-alone analysis tools such as CCAS 
are for such specific purposes as to render them independent from core financial 
management systems. 
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f. Extraordinary Effort 
                 The DFAS also scored positively for success factor extraordinary 
effort.  However, the respondent judged the need for extraordinary effort in a 
negative light.  Her feeling was that the necessity for extraordinary effort was 
detrimental to the organization in that that level of effort will result in increased 
risk.  The respondent’s idea was that working toward the goal of sustainability in 
audit readiness in tandem with attaining audit readiness year after year should 
render extraordinary effort superfluous. 
       Her cure for extraordinary effort consisted of several actions: 
staying in touch with external auditors and customers, documenting processes, 
and leveraging all of the organization’s assets. 
       By staying in touch with auditors and customers, the respondent 
held that the organization could avoid large surprises.  Indeed, the new 
accounting cycle of 21 days makes this consistent communication almost a 
necessity.  With independent auditors starting testing controls in the second, 
third, and fourth quarters of the fiscal year, continuous communication is 
paramount. 
       Documenting processes, systems, methods, and procedures leads 
to a better ability to assert the readiness for audit, in her opinion.  In this way, the 
organization can insulate itself against relying on the knowledge of its people and 
instead rely on its process.  By documenting and educating personnel on the 
process, the respondent felt that an organization could protect itself against 
personnel losses, personnel rotations, and the necessity of re-learning the 
organization’s financial management systems: all root causes of the necessity for 
Herculean effort. 
       Lastly, the interviewee confirmed that an organization had to 
leverage all of its assets to build and maintain auditability.  Again, she cautioned 
that utilizing these assets came with a price.  She specifically mentioned utilizing 
contractors and COTS systems. 
       The DFAS did and does utilize contract personnel to perform 
specialized tasks and contribute to the increased workload of achieving 
63
auditability year after year.  However, the respondent cautioned that over-
reliance on contractor personnel could cause a loss of corporate knowledge.  Her 
concern was that when the contractors left the organization, so would the 
knowledge.  Her cure for this was the documentation process.  Again, if you 
improve the process, the loss of key personnel should have a mitigated effect. 
       COTS financial systems can cause as many problems as they 
solve.  Newer, more stringent financial management systems mean an increase 
in the number and specificity of controls.  More controls force accountants and 
financial managers to look deeper into organizational processes and practices.  
The more interrelated and sophisticated the accounting software and processes 
become, the easier it is to “lock up” your systems.45  Again, process 
documentation is the cure. 
 
2. MRF 
      The Military Retirement Fund (or MRF) is an entity with a great many 
future liabilities (future pensions) and very few transactions.  A majority of 
employees working for the MRF are actuaries working to account for, invest, and 
report on the funds needed to pay present and future liabilities.  The MRF 
responded positively to five of six success factors.  The one success factor 
scored negatively was partnering with Inspector General.  However, all six 
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Figure 3-9.  Summary of The Military Retirement Fund Respondent 
Results 
 
                                            
45 DFAS Interview, November 13, 2006. 
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a. Leadership Commitment 
                 The Military Retirement Fund was graded positively for leadership 
commitment.  The reason for this assessment is the MRF respondent’s view that 
senior executive leadership has supported audit readiness as a goal over the 
objections of non-financial managers throughout the Department of Defense.   
       Objections cited by this interviewee were that financial 
management reforms have become too expensive and have gone too far.  Non-
financial managers, according to the respondent, believe that the pace of 
financial management reform has out-stripped its utility.  He believes that the 
message of the usefulness and centrality of auditable financial statements has 
not been completely understood. The respondent argued that the 
communications effort can be likened to a significant culture change.  Changing 
peoples’ attitudes is a challenging obstacle to financial management reform. 
 
b. Positive Resource Allocation 
                 The MRF also received a positive grade for positive resource 
allocation.  Although the MRF has not dedicated its own resources to 
modernizing financial management systems and the educational effort, it has 
leveraged the work of the Department of Defense in these areas.  The 
respondent specifically credited the DoD’s Financial Improvement and Audit 
Readiness (FIAR) Plan with significant strides in these two efforts. 
       The respondent for the MRF credits the FIAR Plan with both 
demanding standardized results and dictating focus areas and with leaving the 
process improvements up to the components who are expert in their own 
missions and processes.  The respondent sees this as a more efficient and 
effective process than waiting to build consensus on solutions and standards. 
       The DoD has also leveraged contract personnel to build and deliver 
training courses to change the expectations and skill sets of financial 
management and non-financial management personnel alike.  The MRF’s 
respondent believes the DoD has taken the correct path of people and process 
improvement. 
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c. Partnering With Inspector General 
                 The Military Retirement Fund was graded negatively on success 
factor partnering with the Inspector General.  The contributing causes of this 
grade were: culture change within the DoD Inspector General staff, the 
transitioning mission of the Inspector General, and the need to maintain 
independence within the IG staff.  These themes were echoed earlier in this 
paper but are confirmed yet again by another Defense agency. 
       The mission of the DoD Inspector General has changed 
significantly.  From merely auditing contracts to being actively engaged in 
financial management improvement and reform is a large step.   
       The financial executive from the MRF who responded to this study 
likened the transition to that of the Internal Revenue Service.  “Those guys 
[DODIG] were feared […] theirs was very much a ‘gotcha’ role.”46  Transforming 
that image has been a goal of the DODIG according to the MRF respondent. 
       The MRF financial executive also reported that the DODIG has 
taken on a more “partnering” role within the Department of Defense.  According 
to the respondent, the IG staff is much more cooperative and more likely to 
engage in advance discussions regarding asserting financial statements as audit-
ready.  Although the IG staff retains the right to give the assertion opinion on an 
agency’s financial statements, they have taken on a more informal advisory role 
within the DoD. 
       As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Inspector General staff’s 
need to maintain its independence as an outside auditor has rendered cultural 
change tentative according to the interviewee.  The respondent lauds the efforts 
of the IG because of its difficult and often contradictory roles. 
 
d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
                 The Military Retirement Fund also received a positive grade for 
success factor cooperation with non-financial managers. However, the 
 
46 MRF Interview, November 13, 2006. 
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respondent saw cooperation of non-financial managers, for the most part, as 
compelled cooperation rather than willing cooperation. 
       Echoing the comments of his fellow respondents, this interviewee 
placed the onus of educating and winning over non-financial managers upon the 
accounting and comptroller leadership.  He mentioned that the Chief Financial 
Officer for the DoD had challenged those two communities to increase value 
added to non-financial leadership.  The respondent accepted that educator role 
to be a positive force in proving the financial manager’s value to the whole 
organization. 
 
e. Short-term Systems 
                 The MRF earned a positive grade for success factor short-term 
systems as well.  However, the interviewee saw a direct linkage in the number of 
short-term (workaround) systems and the extraordinary efforts required attaining 
auditability year after year.  The respondent saw workarounds as temporary fixes 
undertaken in order to accomplish the task of achieving audit readiness.  He 
lamented the fact that the number of workarounds contributed enormously to the 
workload endured by accounting staffs. 
       The respondent mentioned that the MRF personnel had to collect 
over 14,000 samples or documents to prove auditability.  This effort, as he sees 
it, causes the MRF personnel to place their hopes in future financial management 
systems that will substantially decrease the field-work required. 
 
f. Extraordinary Effort 
                 Lastly, the Military Retirement Fund was graded as present for the 
success factor extraordinary effort.  The respondent saw continued extraordinary 
effort but not to the same degree as that required to attain auditability.  The 
trends he noticed were: an increase in expertise in achieving auditability was 
coupled with a decrease in reliance upon short-term systems and that heroic 
effort was becoming less and less necessary as expertise increased among 
accounting and auditing staffs. 
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3. DeCA 
      The Defense Commissary Agency’s results are shown in Figure 3-10.  
The DeCA was graded positively across all six success factors. The DeCA is a 
model agency which achieved laudable results in gaining and sustaining clean 
audit opinions despite facing increased resource constraints and utilizing legacy 
financial systems.  The DeCA has received consecutive clean audit opinions for 
the last five years--starting with FY2001 up to and including FY2006.  A brief 
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Figure 3-10.  Summary of The Defense Commissary Agency Respondent 
Results 
 
a. Leadership Commitment 
                 The DeCA was positively graded for the presence of success factor 
leadership commitment.  The respondent for the DeCA held very strongly the 
idea that attaining and sustaining a clean audit opinion was unthinkable without 
leadership commitment starting from the very top.  Mr. Patrick Nixon, formerly the 
Chief Executive Officer and now the Director of the DeCA arrived at the same 
time as the goal of attaining auditable financial statements.  The respondent, 
from the beginning, said the effort to attain auditability was championed by the 
CEO/Director, Mr. Nixon.  In fact, this past July, at the Defense Finance 
Conference, Mr. Nixon presented a briefing on this very subject.  His talk was 
entitled, “Defense Commissary Agency: The Premier Benefit of a Global Force.” 
       The interviewee agreed most strongly that leadership commitment 
was the number-one success factor she could name.  The respondent for the 
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DeCA mentioned three attributes in talking about leadership commitment: buy-in 
at every level, quarterly process reviews, and personal accountability.   
       Buy-in at every level was ensured through feed-back mechanisms 
that were new to the DeCA in 2001.  Stores had not been given financial 
statements before but were now receiving performance numbers that allowed for 
comparison.  Zone managers, regional directors, and headquarters staff were 
forced to reinvent themselves and develop skill sets within. 
       Quarterly process reviews were another performance metric 
instituted under Mr. Nixon.  These processes were reviewed and compared 
across store, zone (eight to twelve stores), and region.  In stock rates, customer 
satisfaction and other performance measures were instituted that tied store 
performance to enterprise goals, something that had never been seen before at 
the DeCA. 
       Lastly, the respondent reported that personal accountability was the 
most effective tool used to ensure commitment was shared at every leadership 
level in the DeCA.  Her phrase, “you got sent to Siberia if you weren’t 
performing,”47 spoke volumes about the intensity of leadership commitment and 
focus. 
 
b. Positive Resource Allocation 
                 The DeCA received a positive score on the success factor positive 
resource allocation.  This score was awarded despite the fact that the DeCA had 
sustained a serious setback in finances at exactly the same time as the effort to 
achieve auditability began.  Despite that, the DeCA committed itself to applying 
the resources it had and achieved significant success. 
       The DeCA is taking part in the Defense Agency Initiative designed 
to bring updated financial management software from COTS technology.  
However, it must be noted that the DeCA achieved its auditability goals with 
legacy systems. 
 
47 DeCA Interview, November 13, 2006. 
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       The DeCA was forced to pay for financial improvements within the 
existing budget.  Contract employees, temporary uniformed military accountants 
and process improvements were all “taken out of hide” as the interviewee 
explained it. 
       Compounding the difficulty in affording modernization was the 
budget reality across all of DoD.  Constrained resources and the Global War on 
Terror have diverted funds away from bases here in the United States.  The 
interviewee explained that services traditionally provided to the DeCA such as 
armed escorts for money transfers, grass cutting, and utilities dried up as the 
military base budgets became more and more limited. 
       On top of these difficulties was that the facilities portion of the 
DeCA was broken. There were, in FY2000 and FY2001, not enough funds to 
recapitalize the physical property of the DeCA.  The five percent surcharge 
added to each customer’s grocery bill was going to operating costs--not 
infrastructure as intended when the surcharge was created.           
       Additionally, the DeCA was forced to accept a reduction in their 
Defense Working Capital Fund.  The size of the cut was $130 Million.  The 
respondent stated “that amount may not seem like much in the Defense world, 
but it came out of our $1 Billion appropriation, a thirteen-percent cut.”48
       Despite all of these challenges, the DeCA met and continues to 
meet its auditability goals.  The respondent insisted that the DeCA’s 
achievements were accomplished through embracing the challenges, especially 
the increased accountability rules, instead of seeking relief from legislation or 
giving in to frustration at the external factors and large barriers to success. 
 
c. Partnering With Inspector General 
                 The DeCA also received a positive grade for partnering with 
Inspector General.  The respondent credits the audit committee for nurturing this 
cooperative spirit within the organization. 
 
48 DeCA Interview, November 13, 2006. 
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       The Defense Commissary Agency has two auditing arms: the 
internal inspector General office and the Office of Internal Review.  The Inspector 
General’s mandate is uncovering and confronting fraud, waste, and abuse of 
government funds and property.  The office for internal review conducts audits of 
the financial systems and statements throughout the year.  The internal auditing 
staff’s schedule is dictated by the Government Accountability Office’s information 
requests and the Inspector General staff’s uncovering of suspect systems 
controls. 
      
d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
                 The DeCA received a positive grade for success factor cooperation 
of non-financial managers.  The respondent noted that compelling cooperation 
was part of the audit readiness strategy, but involving non-financial managers in 
the change process was a strategic choice as well.   
       The audit committee holds monthly meetings and involves, as a 
matter of policy, functional managers in creating and implementing solutions.  
The DeCA’s contracted external auditing firm, KPMG LLC, issues 
recommendations that the DeCA must then consider and if concurred with, acted 
upon.  As a matter of policy, functional managers are the personnel given 
responsibility for implementing process improvements suggested by KPMG.   
       The respondent was proud to note that the DeCA continues to have 
very few non-concurrences to KPMG recommendations.  She notes this to 
emphasize that the DeCA did not shrink from the challenges it faced. 
 
e. Short-term Systems 
                The DeCA was graded positively for success factor short-term 
systems.  The DeCA has made and continues to make extensive use of short-
term systems or workarounds in their financial management. 
       The reason for such heavy reliance upon workarounds is that the 
DeCA’s financial management systems are archaic and aren’t very well-suited for 
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modern managerial decision-making needs. The lack of available data and lack 
of suitable formats made workarounds inevitable. 
       The case-in-point mentioned by the interviewee was the fact that 
store managers received two payroll reports monthly.  These reports were simply 
insufficient to assist the manager in improving efficiency.  The workaround 
systems created in Microsoft Excel format now give productivity ratios for 
individual stores and compare stores with their peers.  In fact, the DeCA has 
made significant steps to keep pace with industrial standards in the private 
market-place.  The interviewee hastened to add that the DeCA compared most 
favorably with industry effectiveness and efficiency measures against its private-
sector peers.49
 
f. Extraordinary Effort 
                 This research awarded a positive grade for the DeCA in the 
success factor extraordinary effort. The reasons for awarding this grade were: 
extraordinary effort over a short period of time, application of personnel, use of 
contractors and COTS software investment, and task force creation. 
       The respondent for the DeCA reported enthusiastically regarding 
the ongoing “Herculean effort” within the accounting staffs.  Responding to the 
newly compacted twenty-one-day reporting period each month, accounting staff 
spend most holiday weekends readying financial statements for auditability.  The 
interviewee could not give enough credit to the accounting staff for sustained 
effort in maintaining the focus on auditability. 
        Another reason the DeCA was awarded a positive grade for 
extraordinary effort was the application of extra manpower to problem financial-
reporting focus areas within the organization.  The respondent reported hiring 
temporary personnel and borrowing manpower from non-financial divisions to 
accomplish the laborious tasks of ensuring audit readiness, such as: counting 
inventory, verifying physical assets, updating information technology systems, 
and validating financial records. 
 
49 DeCA Interview, November 13, 2006. 
72
       The last reason for the Defense Commissary Agency’s positive 
grade was the creation of task forces designed to eliminate weaknesses in 
financial reporting.  Under the direct guidance of the DeCA’s audit committee, 
task forces were created.  These task forces were built from all disciplines within 
the DeCA staff and, most importantly, included functional managers who actually 
owned the processes being strengthened.   
       When KPMG, the DeCA’s independent auditing contractor, 
reported material weaknesses in “mini audits” conducted mid-year and 
immediately prior to issuing their official audit report.  The DeCA was very 
proactive in correcting discrepancies and embracing these criticisms as 
opportunities to improve.  This level of communication, openness and decisive 
action secured the DeCA’s control over its financial management reform 
processes and all but guaranteed an unqualified audit opinion.   
 
E. COMPARISON OF THE THREE ILLUSTRATIVE RESPONDENT 
COMPONENTS 
      All three respondent components: the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service, the Military Retirement Fund, and the Defense Commissary Agency 
performed extremely well when evaluated against the six success factors.  This 
result conformed to expectations in that these three have received clean audit 
opinions for several years.   
      These three components shared similar opinions regarding the value of 
financial management reform and the pursuit of audit readiness.  In fact, of the 
three evaluations, only two success factors were graded negatively out of 18 
possible.  Below are observations that echo among the three interviews 
categorized by success factor. 
 
1. Leadership Commitment 
      All three respondents placed strong emphasis on the primacy of 
leadership commitment in attaining and sustaining a clean audit opinion.  
Leadership commitment is essential to: focus the effort, assign resources, and 
approve the auditability plan. 
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      Senior leaders must understand the auditability process in order to 
communicate it to the organization.  The respondents from the DeCA and the 
DFAS were particularly insistent that unless leaders were personally committed, 
the organization was unlikely to sustain the effort to achieve audit readiness. 
      Resource assignment is a critical policing type of function only leaders 
within the organization can accomplish.  The respondents saw this function: the 
resource allocation decision-making as signaling to the organization that audit 
readiness was and remains a priority goal of the agency. 
      Approving the auditability plan is most critical, argues the respondent from 
the DFAS.  She saw the “definition stage” as most important because if 
sustainability resources are not considered in tandem with attainment resources, 
the effort is handicapped. The DFAS interviewee also said that senior leaders 
understanding and approval of the auditability plan is vital; fewer resources will 
be wasted because senior leadership has the unique opportunity to align the 
organization behind the planned effort. 
      By approving the auditability plan, senior leadership makes resource 
determinations and emphasizes that audit readiness is a priority for the 
organization.  The respondent from the Military Retirement Fund saw resource 
prioritization as the key function of senior leadership.  He also saw senior leaders 
as solely responsible for compelling cooperation from unconvinced managers 
because only they had the authority to do so. 
 
2. Positive Resource Allocation 
.   All three respondents agreed that positive resource allocation was an 
important factor in the audit readiness plan.  However, two interesting ideas 
about positive resource allocation came from the DFAS and DeCA respectively.  
The DFAS interviewee clearly stated that sustainability resources must be 
allocated along with attainment resources.  The DeCA respondent’s point was 
that monetary resources or the lack thereof cannot be construed as an excuse 
for failing to plan for or achieve auditability. 
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      The respondent for the DFAS was adamant that resources must be 
allocated to improving processes.  Her concern was that as challenges to 
sustaining audits emerge: knowledge transfers, process change, systems 
upgrades, business changes, and personnel changes all contribute to challenges 
in maintaining auditability.  Her solution was to invest in process improvements 
and document processes so that as circumstances change, the organization can 
rely on the process- and financial-management system to keep pace--not the 
fallible personnel who run them. 
      The DeCA’s respondent took the opposite view: that automation first is not 
appropriate.  In her experience, focusing on the people behind the effort is what 
pays immediate dividends and causes lasting improvement. 
      The DeCA’s respondent took that thought a step further to argue that a 
lack of dedicated resources and an atmosphere of constrained resources should 
not be an excuse for failing to plan for audit readiness or even achieve audit 
readiness.  Her view was that organizations have a wealth of resources besides 
money for systems improvement, and that aligning those resources was the true 
locus of effort to achieve auditability. 
 
3. Partnering With Inspector General 
      All three components recognized that the auditing function within the DoD 
was undergoing tremendous changes.  Culture change and mission change were 
at the heart of this upheaval.  However, all three iterated that the auditing staffs 
and, in particular, the Department of Defense Inspector General staff were 
responding positively and meaningfully to adjust and make the most of their new 
roles as co-participants in the auditability process. 
      While all respondents concluded that partnership with the internal auditing 
or Inspector General staff was important, the MRF interviewee had the most to 
say about this issue.  He acknowledged that while the Department of Defense 
Inspector General (or DoD IG) was undergoing tremendous cultural and mission 
change, it was the responsibility of the accountants and comptrollers of the 
organization to communicate and lead change. 
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      His premise was that the accountants and comptrollers were the subject-
matter experts in the goal of auditability; so, those personnel must take the lead.  
In his opinion, accountants must and should bring increased value to the 
organization by inserting themselves in traditionally non-financial processes to 
prove the ability to contribute. 
 
4. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
      All three respondents agreed that the cooperation of non-financial 
managers was important.  The DFAS interviewee explained that if non-financial 
managers were not a part of the process, then they would slow down the 
process.   
      Both the MRF interviewee and the interviewee for the DeCA believed that 
cooperation, if not voluntary, should be compelled.  Two ways to compel 
cooperation from non-financial managers is to educate or provide adverse 
consequences for failing to cooperate.  Again, the MRF respondent believed that 
it was the responsibility of the financial experts, the accountants and 
comptrollers, to prove the value of auditability.  The DeCA respondent noted that 
the DeCA would punish uncooperative non-financial managers by “sending them 
to Siberia:” a euphemistic expression for adversely affecting the career 
progression of problematic managers. 
 
5. Short-term Systems 
      All three interviewees recognized the inevitability of workarounds or short-
term systems and acknowledged their usefulness.  However, both the DFAS and 
the MRF respondents were negative in their views towards the implications of 
workarounds. 
      The respondent for the MRF pointed to the fact that legacy systems are 
rendered inadequate by new legislation.  Older systems weren’t built to capture 
the data required to satisfy modern reporting requirements.  In his view, 
workarounds meant a tremendous amount of busywork: translating data, 
compiling data, and formatting the data required to present necessary reports. 
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      The DFAS respondent also took a dim view of workarounds, albeit 
recognizing their usefulness.  She said the goal of building sustainability within 
the audit readiness plan should eliminate the need for workarounds. 
 
6. Extraordinary Effort 
      The three respondents all agreed that extraordinary effort was the rule 
rather than the exception.  The most direct reason for the need for extraordinary 
effort is the compressed accounting schedule.  The DFAS respondent mentioned 
that the twenty-one-day reporting schedule meant that her independent auditor 
firm, UKW, was testing internal controls in the second, third, and fourth quarters 
consecutively.  The DeCA respondent stated that her accounting staff spent most 
holiday weekends at DFAS Columbus readying financial statements for audits.       
      All three respondents also stated that the Herculean effort did not end 
when auditability was attained.  Sustaining a clean audit opinion presented its 
own challenges.  The DFAS respondent put it succinctly when she stated 
“establishing the baseline is an achievement, but improving upon that baseline 
while people are changing, rules are changing, and the business changes all 
present unique, but no less strenuous challenges as well.”50
 
F. SIX SUCCESS FACTORS FOR ALL RESPONDENTS 
      Financial management executives from the nine respondent components 
were interviewed via telephone and/or email.  Below, Figure 3-11 gives the 
summary grading of the six success factors for the nine respondent components 
and their 2005 independent audit results.   
 In examining the figure below, it becomes clear that the Brook 
methodology isn’t 100% predictive.  Although the three uniformed services 
predictably had disclaimed audit opinions, the three smaller components with 
disclaimed opinions (DISA, DLA, and USSOCOM) scored positively according to 
the Brook methodology.  The three components both scoring positively and 
 
50 DFAS interview, November 13, 2006. 
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earning unqualified opinions (DFAS, MRF and DeCA) tended to confirm the 
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Figure 3-11.  The Six Success Factor Grades for All Respondents 
 
G. OTHER FACTORS 
           Only the Military Retirement Fund respondent answered positively when 
questioned as to other factors contributing to a successful audit.  He included “a 
fertile environment”51 to the list.  His suggestion was that the organizational 
culture must undergo a shock in order to gain the impetus to change.  He said 
that the shock could be monetary, legislative, or catastrophic.  Monetary shocks 
could be severe budget cuts.  He described legislative shocks as laws passed 
                                            
51 MRF Interview, November 13, 2006. 
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targeting financial reporting within the organization.  Lastly, catastrophic shock 





A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
           This study has examined the goal of audit readiness and business 
systems modernization for the Department of Defense.  The audit readiness goal 
has been scrutinized through the lens of the six success factors previously 
identified in the Brook methodology.  As such, this study sought to answer two 
questions: 
• Can the success factors identified by Brook be found in the DoD 
components attaining unqualified audit opinions? 
• Can the success factors identified by Brook be found within the DoD at the 
enterprise-level? 
      The answer to the first question is presented below in Sections One 
through Six.  The answer to the second question is answered in Section Seven 
below.   
The three uniformed services: the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the 
U.S. Navy have all been examined through scoring representative responses to 
questionnaires and interviews.  Secondarily, this study examined three 
components: DISA, DLA and USSOCOM who reacted more positively to the 
Brook methodology but still have disclaimed opinions. Lastly, as the previous six 
organizations do not, as yet, have clean audit opinions, this study also examined 
three components which have achieved clean audit opinions: the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, the Military Retirement Fund, and the Defense 
Commissary Agency.   
Six of the nine components: the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. 
Navy, DeCA, DFAS, and MRF all conform to Brook’s methodology.  However, 
three of the components: DLA, DISA, and USSOCOM did not.  Speculating on 
the reason for this disparity in data is difficult. 
There are three possible reasons for this disparity in data: the data is 
flawed, the methodology is flawed or the application of the methodology is 
flawed.  Each reason requires a brief explanation. 
80
  The tendency to self-report more positively may be the cause if flawed 
data is the culprit.  Interviewees try to guess where the interviewer’s emphasis 
resides and will exceed reality when reporting their organization’s performance.   
A flawed methodology could be a cause of non-conforming results.  The 
Brook methodology may be incomplete or not one hundred percent predictive.  It 
may be that these six success factors are necessary but insufficient in and of 
themselves.  Other factors may have to be considered in order to gain a more 
clear understanding of why some DoD components succeed where others fail. 
Lastly, it may be that the Brook methodology was too narrowly applied.  
Given time and resource constraints, a modified Delphi technique was the only 
viable research option.  However, if more respondents from other areas of 
expertise were interviewed, perhaps the data results would have been different.  
A second flawed technique may have been the scoring of success factors.  If a 
component received a four out of six possible for positive resource allocation but 
still hasn’t been audited successfully, perhaps the other two subordinate 
questions were the essential factors. 
In conclusion, more study is needed to confirm these suppositions.  DoD 
is a complex organization.  A more comprehensive study with more respondents 
is needed to shed more light on the above hypotheses.    
This data collection effort was designed to bring to light accomplishments 
and attitudes concerning the six success factors: leadership commitment, 
positive resource allocation, partnering with Inspector General, cooperation of 
non-financial managers, short-term systems, and extraordinary effort.  A brief 
summary of conclusions follows organized by success factor.  
 
1. Leadership Commitment 
       
a. Finding 
           All three services (the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy) were all 
graded positively on success factor: leadership commitment.  However, 
leadership commitment understood in light of the judgments of the three 
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successful components (the DFAS, the MRF and DeCA) has specific 
characteristics. 
       
b. Recommendation 
           The three successful respondents emphasized that leadership is 
essential to: focus the audit readiness effort, assign resources, and approve the 
auditability plan.  It is in the first two tasks that specific recommendations can be 
found. 
                 Focusing the audit readiness effort could be a challenge for the 
Navy.  The Navy has four pilot programs under the control of the four systems 
commands.  Although the Navy is confident that this strategy can be fed into its 
Financial Improvement Program, there is risk in having four semi-autonomous 
pilot programs occurring simultaneously.  As the DFAS respondent cautioned, a 
waste of resources might result and slow down the audit-readiness goal if senior 
leadership should lose focus on the desired result. 
                The second task that the successful components insist is critical for 
senior leadership is assigning resources.  If leadership commits to a goal of 
financial management improvement and audit readiness but under-funds the 
effort, delay and loss of impetus is certain to result.  The U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Air Force respondents expressed mild dissatisfaction with the funding effort for 
financial management reform.  The conclusion to be made is that these two 
entities are incurring risk in this area. 
 
2. Positive Resource Allocation 
       
a. Finding 
           Two uniformed services (the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army) 
expressed mild dissatisfaction with the funding efforts within their organizations.  
It is clear that resources and effort have been applied but the Army, in particular, 
mentioned that financial improvement falls to the bottom of the funding priority 




       The DeCA’s respondent provided a counterpoint in this discussion 
of positive resource allocation.  Her experience at the DeCA indicates that the 
lack of monetary resources should not confound the financial-improvement effort.  
Her view was that organizations should leverage the myriad non-financial 
resources at their disposal.  Finally, she recommended that organizations use the 
pervasive lack of financial resources and use that lack to make the argument for 
the need for financial-management reform. 
           Congress should fence-off funding for business transformation.  
While two of three  “Big Three” components (USA and USAF) reported that 
funding for business transformation had been and continues to be taken “out of 
hide,” funding for business transformation will continue to receive short shrift in 
times of national crisis or war.  With Congressional funding, the services would 
have resources legally set aside for business modernization not under the control 
of DoD.  The services could continue to pursue independent paths to auditability 
but a lack of resources would cease to be an obstacle. 
       Appropriating money for financial management transformation will 
send a message to the services that the goals of auditability--transparency, 
reliability and timeliness--are not simply unfunded mandates levied on a 
financially-constrained DoD.   
       As a positive example, the Department of the Navy has budgeted 
funds over the Future Years Defense Plan or FYDP for the Department of the 
Navy Financial Improvement Plan (or DONFIP).  The Navy feels confident that 
the funding stream for this effort will be consistent.  However, if Financial 
Management leadership within the Navy is unsuccessful in maintaining 
enthusiasm and support for the DONFIP, the business management will incur 
risk. 
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3. Partnering With Inspector General 
       
a. Finding 
           All three uniformed services were graded negatively for success 
factor partnering with Inspector General.  It is not because the services have 
been neglecting this relationship; it is that the relationship is still in its infancy.  
Culture change, a shifting of the mission, and a learning curve of new skill sets 




                  The conclusion offered by the respondent from the Military 
Retirement Fund is simple:  challenge the accounting and comptroller staffs, as 
subject-matter experts, to educate others and lead the modernization effort.  He 
opined that financial managers must insert themselves into traditionally non-
financial processes and prove their ability to contribute. 
 
4. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
       
a. Finding 
            All three services were graded as absent for the success factor: 
cooperation of non-financial managers.  The reasons for this uncooperativeness 
were given as follows: lack of education, prioritization, and organizational biases. 
       
b. Recommendation 
          For the first two causal factors, the successful components’ 
respondents had a simple answer: have accountants and comptrollers take the 
lead in educating non-financial managers.  However, both the MRF and the 
DeCA respondents went a step further: if cooperation could not be gained 
voluntarily, organizational leaders should compel cooperation.  The DeCA 
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interviewee’s joke about sending underperforming managers to Siberia is 
relevant here. 
         The Defense Business Transformation Agency should develop and 
fund a comprehensive communications education effort behind the goal of 
auditability within the DoD.  All respondents, whether successful or not in 
auditability, reported that educating non-financial managers and the non-financial 
workforce was their number-one obstacle in success factor cooperation of non-
financial managers.  Mr. Engelbrektsson, Deputy Comptroller for the Defense 
Logistics Agency, said it best when he stated “Everything we do here [in DLA] is 
a financial event, from tents, boots, and medical supplies.”52  If the FM 
community within the DoD could convince its various components’ managers of 
that fact, auditability and the benefits that it connotes would follow. 
             Organizational bias can be alleviated by changing the processes to 
achieve auditable financial statements.  The DFAS respondent places primary 
emphasis on engineering the processes to produce the desired results.  This 
would decrease the effect of uncooperative non-financial managers and insulate 
the accounting staffs from knowledge transfers when personnel rotate in and out 
of the organization. 
 
5. Short-term Systems 
       
a. Finding 
          The Army and the Navy were graded negatively for the presence of 
success factor short-term systems.  Each service opposed short-term systems 
on philosophical grounds.  The Army and Navy reported that short-term systems 
would detract from the effort to develop a core financial management system.  
While both services have directed their financial modernization effort into 
Enterprise Resource Planning or ERP systems, the successful components have 
some counterpoints worth considering. 
 
 
52 DLA interview, 30 October 2006. 
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b. Recommendation 
       All three successful components point out that short-term systems 
or workarounds are inevitable and useful.  While the DeCA respondent was 
enthusiastic about the use and need for workarounds, the other two respondents 
were less positive in their comments. 
       The other two respondents from the MRF and DFAS agreed that 
workarounds were a necessary component of successful audit readiness 
planning.  However, these two respondents agreed with the Army and Navy that 
a successful, sustainable core financial management system upgrade would 
obviate the need for workarounds.  Further, these two respondents stated that 
workarounds may cause more effort to be expended in the long-run as 
workarounds, by definition, require more operator interface.  Summing up, the 
successful respondents agree in principal with the services that workarounds are 
counter to the long-term effort but acknowledge short-term systems’ usefulness 
in achieving the auditability goal. 
 
6. Extraordinary Effort 
 
a. Finding 
               Both the Army and the Air Force were graded negatively for success 
factor: extraordinary effort.  The Navy was graded positively but the respondent 
for the Navy said that extraordinary effort was not the Navy’s goal; a deliberate, 
incremental approach was the goal. 
        
b. Recommendation  
           All three successful agency respondents caution that extraordinary 
effort is the rule--not the exception.  Furthermore, the DFAS respondent added 
that sustaining an audit opinion was as difficult if not more difficult a task than 
obtaining a clean audit. 
                 The essential criticism of the uniformed services’ view of 
extraordinary effort is that their incremental, deliberate approach assumes a fixed 
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goal.  This fixed goal is simply not the case according to the DFAS respondent:  
“The problems with sustaining an audit are numerous: knowledge transfers when 
personnel leave, processes change, systems change, your business changes, 
there is not the same energy level year after year, the auditors change and 
become savvier, etc.”53
      
7. DoD at the Enterprise Level 
 Consistent themes and insights gained from examining the nine 
respondent components may be applied to DoD.  Below are the six success 
factors and their application to DoD. 
            
a. Leadership Commitment  
           As illustrated in its components above, the DoD still has leadership 
and management challenges in its quest for financial improvement and 
auditability.  In its results-driven approach to financial management reform vis-à-
vis the FIAR Plan, the DoD incurs the risk of presiding over a “stove-piped”54 
approach feared by the Department of the Navy respondent.   
           Risks in this approach include:  inadequate safeguards to ensure 
financial statements uniformity and inadequate safeguards to ensure 
sustainability.  Standard Financial Information Structure (SFIS) is the standard 
imposed by the DoD to ensure enterprise-wide conformity in financial statements.  
However, SFIS is an evolving standard that is only Phase I complete as of May 
2005.55   
 As the DFAS respondent pointed out, leadership commitment 
means: focusing the auditability effort, assigning the resources, and approving 
the auditability plan. The DoD needs to strengthen its leadership role in order to 
ensure auditability across the twenty-four components. 
  
 
53 DFAS interview, November 13, 2006. 
54 DON interview, November 6, 2006. 
55 Wenrich, 23, 2005. 
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b. Positive Resource Allocation 
 The DoD must ensure that resources are applied not only to the 
shorter-term auditability effort but also the longer-term audit-readiness 
sustainability effort.  Recognition that these are two separate but complementary 
efforts is an important factor as well. 
 
c. Partnering With Inspector General 
           The lack of partnering with the DoD IG is a contentious issue.  
Supporters of the status quo say partnering with the DoD IG would compromise 
the independence of the IG and make their assertions suspect.  The IG must 
remain independent of the organizations it is auditing in order to keep its opinions 
above reproach. 
  However, this research concludes that utilizing the DoD IG as 
advisors will only strengthen the audit readiness efforts of the components.  The 
DoD IG’s expertise is only partially exploited when utilized only after the financial 
statements are completed.  Mini-audits throughout the year and an expanded 
education effort from the DoD IG would help components immeasurably. 
 
d. Cooperation of Non-financial Managers 
           The lack of non-financial manager cooperation reported across the 
three uniformed service components is troubling.  This is especially true when 
the fact that Brook found that organizations with cooperation of non-financial 
managers received 2.63 clean opinions across three years and components 
without that cooperation received 0 clean opinions across that same time period.  
Clearly, this cooperation is essential and needs to be cultivated across the DoD. 
 The advice given by the MRF respondent is particularly relevant 
here.  Financial Managers across the DoD must embark upon a robust education 
effort designed to exemplify the benefits of business modernization and audit-
readiness. 
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 The FIAR education plan must also receive greater emphasis.  The 
current educational component of the FIAR Plan is clearly inadequate given the 
lack of awareness of its existence across the DoD. 
Additionally, despite the service components’ apparent focus on 
sustainability issues, the lack of education reported by all respondents for the 
DoD IG and non-financial management remains an ongoing concern.  This lack 
of education also applies to financial managers and the DoD IG as well.  
Accounting skill sets must be stressed; not simply budgetary skill sets. 
 
e. Short-term Systems 
           The DoD must highlight to its components that short-term systems 
or workarounds are essential and inevitable in the quest for audit readiness.  The 
continued operation of legacy financial systems requires that workarounds be 
utilized not shunned.   
 It is true that short-term systems demand more effort.  However, 
workarounds fulfill a need that should not be ignored.  It is possible to decouple 
the effort to achieve auditability while designing and building comprehensive 
financial management systems. 
 
f. Extraordinary Effort 
 The uniformed service components of the DoD also reported that 
extraordinary effort was not their strategy.  This is troubling because successful 
DoD components report there is no way to achieve auditability without 
extraordinary/Herculean efforts.  The DoD must emphasize to its components 
that extraordinary effort is the norm and that the results will justify the means. 
  The DeCA respondent reported that the Office of Management and 
Budget’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) judgment of the DeCA was 
“very motivating to the DeCA.”56  The PART review helps identify a program’s 
strengths and weaknesses to inform funding and management decisions aimed 
 
56 DeCA interview, November 13, 2006. 
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at making the program more effective.57 The DoD also undergoes PART reviews 
yearly. 
 The DoD must realize that it is no longer simply judged on its 
components’ effectiveness.  It is being rigorously judged on its ability to tie 
budgetary resources to component effectiveness.  Extraordinary effort is required 
of all its components. 
 
B. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
      This study was conducted by use of interviews and/or questionnaires to 
financial management executives within the respondent organizations.  The 
enormous complexity of the DoD and its components’ financial management 
systems rendered a comprehensive study impractical.   
This study is limited in that all components required to submit independent 
financial statements did not respond to requests for information.  Therefore, this 
study is relies on the concept of “materiality” as it applies in accounting.  This 
study deems the respondent organizations as constituting materiality because 
the respondent organizations--USAF, USN, USA, DLA, DISA, USSOCOM, 
DeCA, DFAS, and DCAA--constitute the majority of assets under management in 
the DoD.  The positive and negative responses given in this study will, by virtue 
of the size and assets under management of the respondents, constitute success 
or failure of the DoD to achieve the aims of the CFO Act of 1990. 
   The conclusion to be gained from the extension of the Brook methodology 
is that it is not 100% predictive.  The tendency for respondent components to 
self-report positively must be considered a constraint of the paper.   
Unfortunately, there is no test for intentions or probability in the outcomes 
of the DoD’s efforts to achieve auditability.  Subjective grading was therefore 
used to score agency responses to the questions designed to draw out the 
presence or absence of the six success factors discussed in Chapter II. 
 
 
57 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/part, November 2006. 
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C. TOPICS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
The Brook methodology should be extended and updated to all twenty-
four entities required to provide the DoD with independent audited financial 
statements.  Statistical analysis of the above research should be undertaken to 
further validate the applicability of the six success strategies in achieving 
auditability. 
Research should be conducted into the effectiveness of the educational 
effort behind the FIAR Plan.  The BTA has contracted for development and 
teaching of the required skill sets to senior financial and non-financial leadership 
within DoD components.  Studying the effectiveness of the educational effort 
would help the DoD provide new financial skill sets to more of its uniformed and 
civilian leadership. 
This study should be expanded to include the opinions and attitudes of 
uniformed leadership, the DoD IG, and component internal auditing staffs.  A 
more complete and clearer idea of the presence or absence of Brook’s six 
success factors would result.  
A study should be undertaken which investigates the changes that the 
DoD IG has undergone and its blueprint for the future.  The DoD IG has 
undergone changes that require new skill sets and organizational culture.  
Analysis of the DoD IG’s new mission focus and plan for change would assist the 
DoD in its effort to modernize its business practices across all of its components. 
 




APPENDIX A.  SUMMARY OF DOD COMPONENTS AND THEIR 
AUDIT OPINIONS 
AGENCY 2005 AUDIT OPINION 
Army General Fund Disclaimed 
Army Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
Navy General Fund Disclaimed 
Navy Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
Air Force General Fund Disclaimed 
Air Force Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
Military Retirement Fund Unqualified 
DoD Medicare-eligible Retiree Health Care 
Fund 
Qualified 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Civil Works) Disclaimed 
Defense Logistics Agency Disclaimed 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service Unqualified 
Defense Information Systems Agency Disclaimed 
Defense Contract Audit Agency Unqualified 
Defense Commissary Agency Unqualified 
Defense Security Service Disclaimed 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency Disclaimed 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Disclaimed 
Chemical Biological and Defense Program Disclaimed 
Missile Defense Agency Disclaimed 
Services Medical Activity Disclaimed 
Tricare Management Activity Disclaimed 
U.S. Special Operations Command Disclaimed 
Marine Corps Working Capital Fund Disclaimed 
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APPENDIX B.  SUCCESSFUL AGENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 
     This questionnaire is designed to solicit pertinent information regarding 
contributing factors in gaining and sustaining a “clean” audit opinion in your 
agency.  Six factors previously identified in research as contributing either 
directly or indirectly in obtaining and sustaining a “clean” audit opinion are: 
Leadership Commitment, Positive Resource Allocation, Partnering with Inspector 
General, Cooperation of Non-financial Managers, Short-term Systems and 
Extraordinary Effort.  In an effort to elicit responses either supporting or 
weakening these factors, the following questions are respectfully submitted.  The 













How would you describe your Agency leadership’s commitment to 
obtaining a “clean” audit opinion? 
 
 
1.  Was the commitment to obtaining a “clean” audit opinion ever on the Agency 
Head’s list of priorities? 
  
2.  Was the effort to obtain the clean audit opinion prominent in internal 
correspondence during the time leading up to the audit opinion? 
 
3.  Was the effort to obtain a clean opinion included in any public statements by 
the leadership of the Agency? 
 
4.  In internal or external briefings, was the effort to obtain a clean audit opinion 
given a high priority? 
 
5.  Were personnel and resource decision meetings made supporting the effort to 
produce financial reports? 
 




7.  Did the Agency head compel cooperation by other entities within the 
organization? 
 
8.  Can you think of anything else that convinced you of the Agency head’s 





Were there ever resource allocation shifts made to aid in the effort to gain a 
clean audit opinion? 
 
 




10.  Did the Agency ever utilize contractor support in its efforts to obtain a clean 
audit opinion? 
 
11.  Did the Agency ever conduct audit training for its financial management 
employees? 
 
12.  Did the Agency ever employ additional temporary labor to either produce the 
financial statements, count inventory or other tasks related to achieving the clean 
audit opinion? 
 
13.  Did the financial managers within the Agency ever complain about a lack of 
resources during the lead-up to the audit?  Were those complaints ever 
addressed? 
 




Partnering with the Inspector General
 
Describe the relationship between the accounting staff and the Inspector 
General (internal auditing) staff. 
15.  Were there prior working relationships between the financial managers and 
the auditing department? 
 
16.  Had there ever been a history of distrust between these two departments? 
 
17.  Had anyone in the financial management department ever complained of a 
“gotcha” mentality in the internal auditing department? 
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18.  Was there any history of “partnering” with the auditing staff, i.e. joint 
approaches to defining problems and proposing solutions, interim reviews or 
“mini-audits,” or negotiated agreements? 
 
19. Were there any other partnerships or official/nonofficial efforts at partnership 
between the auditing staff and other departments within the Agency? 
 
Cooperation of Non-financial Managers
 
Did the effort to achieve a clean audit opinion ever resonate throughout the 
non-financial leadership of the Agency? 
 
20.  Was the Financial Management department able to secure the willing 
cooperation of operating and program managers? 
 
21.  Were there any prior personal relationships between members of the 
Financial Management department and Operating and Program managers? 
 
22.  Were non-financial managers ever convinced of the value of financial 
reporting? 
 
23.  Was cooperation or compliance induced through senior-level directives or 
exercising leverage over budgets or resource-allocation decisions? 
 
24.  Were recognition programs for both financial and non-financial managers 
employed? 
 
25.  Are financial managers still attempting to overcome non-financial manager 
disinterest, resistance, or lack of interest? 
 
26. Did the Agency’s desire for a clean audit opinion resonate with the non-




Were short-term (workaround) systems ever employed to bring financial 
statements up-to-date and auditable? 
 
27.  Did the Agency undertake to replace the core financial management and 
accounting operating system or were short-term “workaround” systems 
employed? 
 
28.  What was the reasoning behind this decision? 
 





What adjectives would you use to describe the effort to achieve a clean 
audit opinion? 
 
30.  Did senior financial managers exert extraordinary effort over a short period 
of time to achieve a clean audit opinion? 
 
31.  Were large numbers of personnel either pulled off of other projects or were 
temporary personnel hired to handle tasks that the regular system could not 
manage? 
 
32.  Did the Agency ever hire a small, private-sector accounting firm to assist in 
the effort? 
 
33.  Were task forces created with temporarily-assigned people either internal to 
the Agency or temporary hires to count inventories, research acquisition 
histories, or enter data? 
 
34.  Was money spent on contractors and commercial-off-the-shelf software to 
organize the effort? 
 
35.  Were there any other essential factors that this questionnaire overlooked 
that contributed either directly or indirectly to the attainment of a clean audit 
opinion for your agency? 
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APPENDIX C.  COMPONENT SCORING SHEET 
ULeadership Commitment 
 
How would you describe senior leadership’s role in preparing for 
auditability? 
 
• Was the commitment to obtaining a “clean” audit opinion ever on the 
Agency Head’s list of priorities? 
 
• Was the effort to obtain the clean audit opinion prominent in internal 
correspondence during the time leading up to the audit opinion? 
 
• Was the effort to obtain a clean opinion included in any public statements 
by the leadership of the Agency? 
 
• In internal or external briefings, was the effort to obtain a clean audit 
opinion given a high priority? 
 
• Were personnel and resource decision meetings made supporting the 
effort to produce financial reports? 
 
• Did the Agency head empower the CFO in internal disputes over resource 
constraints? 
 
• Did the Agency head compel cooperation by other entities within the 
organization? 
 
• Can you think of anything else that convinced you of the Agency head’s 
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UPositive Resource Allocation 
 
Were there ever resource allocation shifts (people or money) made to aid in 
the effort to gain a clean audit opinion? 
 
• Did the Agency, during the time of preparing for the audit, invest in 
financial system upgrades? 
 
• Did the Agency ever utilize contractor support in its efforts to obtain a 
clean audit opinion? 
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• Did the Agency ever conduct audit training for its financial management 
employees? 
 
• Did the Agency ever employ additional temporary labor to either produce 
the financial statements, count inventory or other tasks related to 
achieving the clean audit opinion? 
 
• Did the financial managers within the Agency ever complain about a lack 
of resources during the lead-up to the audit?  Were those complaints ever 
addressed? 
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UPartnering with IG 
 
Describe the relationship between the accounting staff and the Inspector 
General (internal auditing) staff. 
 
• Were there prior working relationships between the financial managers 
and the auditing department? 
 
• Had there ever been a history of distrust between these two departments? 
 
• Had anyone in the financial management department ever complained of 
a “gotcha” mentality in the internal auditing department? 
 
• Was there any history of “partnering” with the auditing staff, i.e. joint 
approaches to defining problems and proposing solutions, interim reviews 
or “mini-audits,” or negotiated agreements? 
 
• Were there any other partnerships or official/nonofficial efforts at 




























Cooperation of Non-financial Managers U 
 
How involved were non-financial managers in the process?  Was it an 
agency-wide effort or contained within the FM’s office? 
 
• Was the Financial Management department able to secure the willing 
cooperation of operating and program managers? 
 
• Were there any prior personal relationships between members of the 
Financial Management department and Operating and Program 
managers? 
 
• Were non-financial managers ever convinced of the value of financial 
reporting? 
 
• Was cooperation or compliance induced through senior-level directives or 
exercising leverage over budgets or resource-allocation decisions? 
 
• Were recognition programs for both financial and non-financial managers 
employed? 
 
• Are financial managers still attempting to overcome non-financial manager 
disinterest, resistance, or lack of interest? 
 
• Did the Agency’s desire for a clean audit opinion resonate with the non-

































Were short-term (workaround) systems ever employed to bring financial 
statements up to date and auditable? 
 
• Did the Agency undertake to replace the core financial management and 
accounting operating system, or were short-term “workaround” systems 
employed? 
 
• What was the reasoning behind this decision? 
 





















What adjectives would you use to describe the effort to achieve a clean 
audit opinion? 
 
• Did senior financial managers exert extraordinary effort over a short period 
of time to achieve a clean audit opinion? 
 
• Were large numbers of personnel either pulled off of other projects or 
were temporary personnel hired to handle tasks that the regular system 
could not manage? 
 
• Did the Agency ever hire a small, private-sector accounting firm to assist 
in the effort? 
 
• Were task forces created with temporarily-assigned people either internal 
to the Agency or temporary hires to count inventories, research acquisition 
histories, or enter data? 
 
• Was money spent on contractors and commercial-off-the-shelf software to 
organize the effort? 
 
• Were there any other essential factors that this questionnaire overlooked 
that contributed either directly or indirectly to the attainment of a clean 
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